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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAW
PROTECTION OF SOUND RECORDINGS*
by Lewis S. Kurlantzick*
A is a musical performer, both an instrumentalist and vo-
calist, with a recording contract with the R record company.
On February 1, R announces to its distributors that in two
weeks it will be releasing a new album containing eleven
songs or 'cuts" and featuring A as the singer. On February
15, the album is released in both phonograph record and
pre-recorded 8 track cartridge form. Some time thereafter P,
an avid reader of the record industry trade magazines, notes
that A's album is number 40 on the Billboard weekly chart
and that it is starred on the chart, a marking which indicates
that it is one of the albums registering the greatest propor-
tionate upward progress that week. P goes out and buys the
album. From the album he duplicates the records and tapes
and markets them commercially.
This scenario, repeated again and again in recent years, is followed
by cries of foul play by performers and record manufacturers claim-
ing that their "property" is being "stolen," and predicting that record
production will drastically diminish or cease if the practice continues.,
*This article is part of a more comprehensive treatment of record duplica-
tion, which will appear in the near future. The forthcoming article will attempt
to determine the need for protection against duplication, and to define the dimen-
sions of an optimal balance between the requirements of record producers for
protection and the interests of the public in the widest dissemination of music at
the lowest possible prices. The article rejects most of the traditional arguments
for protection and attempts a more intensive and sophisticated inquiry than
Congress has undertaken in its ongoing revision of current copyright legislation.
The article concludes that although record producers require some measure of
protection, they need less protection than they have requested and than Congress
seems prepared to give them.
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Professor Robert Bard of the University of Connecticut
School of Law for his invaluable help with this article, in particular for his con-
tributions to the analysis of the impact of the Copyright Act and the commerce
clause.
I. I am concerned here only with state protection of recordings against "piracy."
By "piracy" I refer to the practice of reproducing or re-recording the actual sounds
of a recorded performance. This practice is also known as "dubbing." The pirate
may go beyond duplication of the recordings and also duplicate the label and album
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Naturally, record producers have sought help from Congress, state
legislatures and the courts, all of which have responded to some de-
gree. Most importantly, Congress has amended the Copyright Act to
permit copyrighting of records produced between February 15, 1972
and January 1, 1975. As shall appear, this enactment precludes state
action with respect to such recordings. But the authority of state
courts and legislatures to protect records. produced before and after
that date (assuming that Congress does not extend the January 1, 1975
date) remains an open question, involving extremely complex issues
of federalism.
The constitutionality of any state law protection of recordings has
been challenged. Duplicators claim that the combined effect of the
copyright clause of the Constitution, the Copyright Act and the supre-
macy clause, and a federal policy in favor of the restriction of mono-
polies and the enhancement of competition nullifies existing state
tort and criminal law aimed at unauthorized duplication. State regu-
lation of any work subject to Congress' copyright powers is precluded,
they maintain, whether or not such congressional power has been ex-
ercised. The issue, then, is the respective roles of the states and the
federal government in protecting subject matter which comes within
the reach of the copyright clause. More particularly, the principal
question is whether our federal system imposes limits on the power of
(or cartridge) cover, including the original manufacturer's name and trademark.
I-term this practice "counterfeiting." There is a third character in the duplication
drama. Unlike the pirate and counterfeiter he does not derive his product from a
publicly disseminated record. Rather he attends a live performance by an artist,
tapes that performance, and in turn produces records from the tape. (Alternatively.
he may gain possession of a recording which the artist andlor company decided
not to release and produce records from it.) I call this character a "bootlegger." It
is dear that a stronger argument can be made for protection against the counter-
feiter and bootlegger than against the pirate. The counterfeiter introduces an
element of deceptive merchandising into the transaction. thereby violating the
interest of the consumer and of the economic system in providing accurate infor-
mation to purchasers as to the source of the product being purchased. The boot-
legger violates the artist's legitimate personal interest in determining which of his
live performances will be fixed in recorded form, the quality of that recording.
and whether that recording will be publicly disseminated. Under neither the exist-
ing Copyright Act nor the revision bill are states precluded from acting against
counterfeiters who deceptively palm off their products as the original, or boot-
leggers who tape live performances. E.g., S. 644. 92d Cong.. 1st Sess. § 301(b) (3)
(1971).
Recognizing that the term "piracy" implies a normative judgment about the
behavior described, I have generally avoided its use in the article. When used, it
is as a synonym for "copying."with no pejorative connotations attached.
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the states to afford relief against unauthorized record reproduction
and, if so, what those limits are.
Consideration of this problem must start with the changes in the
Copyright Act effected by the enactment of the McClellan bill by the
92nd Congress in the fall of 1971. In response to increased industry
pressure Senator John McClellan carved out for separate action sev-
eral sections of the pending general Copyright Revision Bill which
make "sound recordings" copyrightable and make unauthorized du-
plication an act of copyright infringement.2 Under the new legisla-
tion, for the first time copyright protection will be extended to the
recorded performance or rendition of a musical composition, in addi-
tion to the long standing protection afforded by the Copyright Act to
the composition itself.
2. Technically, the McClellan bill amended § 5 of the Copyright Act to add
the category of "sound recordings" to the list of copyrightable subject matter and
amended § 1 to give the copyright proprietor "the exclusive right" to make and
distribute "reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound recording."
Sound recordings are defined as "works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds." In other words, the aggregation of sounds which
constitutes the performance captured on the master tape is a "sound recording."
This protection lasts twenty-eight years and may be renewed for a second twenty-
eight year period. The requirements of registration, notice, and similar details are
delineated in Copyright Office, Copyright for Sound Recordings, Circular 56 (1972).
Senator McClellan originally introduced the "anti-piracy" bill on December
18, 1970, at the end of the 91st Congress. S. 4592, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). He re-
introduced the identical bill on February 8, 1971, S. 646, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
and with some amendments, it passed the Senate on April 29, 1971. The House
attached an amendment which limited protection to recordings fixed and pub-
lished before January 1, 1975. The House passed the bill as amended on October
4, 1971. The Senate agreed to the House amendments on October 6, and the
President signed the bill into law on October 15, 1971. Under the new legislation
any recording fixed and published on or after February 15, 1972 and before January
1, 1975 is eligible for copyright protection. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct.
15, 1971). According to the House report, the purpose of limiting the McClellan
amendment to recordings produced before January 1, 1975, is "to provide a period
for further consideration of various alternatives for solving the problems in this
area, before resorting to permanent legislative enactment. By January 1, 1975,
moreover, the protection of s6und iecordings will, it is hoped, be part of a copy-
right law revision." H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1971).
The substance of the McClellan Bill is contained in sections 102, 106, and 114
of the general copyright revision bill. See S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102(a)(7),
106(l)(3), 114(a) (1971). The general revision bill's passage has been delayed for
some time by unresolved issues concerring the copyright liability of community
antenna television systems (CATV) and the relationship of that copyright liability
to regulation of CATV by the Federal Communications Commission. Even so, the
principal sponsors of the revision bill have opposed suggestions for separate enact-
ment of matter contained in the revision bill. Senator McClellan's justification for
[Vol. 5:204
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The states also have attempted to assist the record companies
through both their civil and criminal law. On the civil side, state
courts have applied tort law, usually under the rubric of unfair com-
petition, to the activities of duplicators and have consistently enjoined
these activities at the request of performers and record companies.3
Of the innumerable actions for injunctions and damages,4 in no case
has a duplicator won on the merits, i.e., no court has held his behavior
to be non-tortious under state law. On the criminal side, ten states
have enacted legislation making the unauthorized manufacture or
sale of duplicate recordings a crime,5 and successful prosecutions have
been accomplished. 6
splitting off part of the general revision bill was that the "piracy" situation de-
manded an urgent response and early passage and implementation of a general
revision bill was dubious. See 116 Cong. Rec. 42446 (1970).
3. E.g., Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp.. 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d
414, appeal dismissed, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971); Capitol Records, Inc.
v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 489 (Ill. App. Ct.. 1st District 1970); Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County 1970); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 2d
District 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970); Capitol Records. Inc. v. Greatest
Records, Inc. 43 Misc.2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Duplicators have repeatedly contended that the states are constitutionally
precluded from acting in this area. To date, only one court has accepted this
argument. In that case an association of tape duplicators brought an action seeking
injunctive relief from future criminal prosecutions threatened under the provisions
of the Florida anti-piracy statute. The federal district judge declared the statute
unconstitutional and granted the injunction. Int'l. Tape Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Gerstein,
174 U.S.P.Q. 198 (S.D.Fla. 1972).
4. The reported cases represent only a small fraction of the actions brought.
See, e.g., Brief for Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae at 21 n. 52, Goldstein v. California, cert. granted. 406 US. 956 (1972);
Rosenblatt, Popular Music Firms Push War on Pirates, Portland (Maine) Evening
Express, March 9, 1970, at 7 (Capitol Records obtained injunctions against 75
individuals or companies over a 14 month period in Los Angeles County alone).
Over the last fewA years a month has rarely passed without a trade magazine report-
ing some civil or criminal action against duplicators. See, e.g., Billboard, Sept. 9,
1972, at 4, col. 1 (arrest and conviction of distributors of pirated tapes in New
York); Billboard, June 24, 1972, at 64, col. 3 (injunction issued in Illinois against
duplicator); Billboard, May 13, 1972, at 4, col. 1 (injunction issued in Oregon
against duplicators); Cash Box, July 17, 1971, at 14 (criminal conviction in Cal-
ifornia); Billboard, July 17, 1971, at 23 (injunction issued in Michigan against
duplicators).
5. ARIZONA R.v. STAT. ANN. § 13-1024 (Supp. 1972) (misdemeanor); ARKANsAs
STAT. ANN. § 41-4617 to -4621 (Supp. 1971) (punishable by fine of not less than $50
nor more than $250); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 653h (West 1970) (misdemeanor);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.041 (1972) (misdemeanor); Louisiana Act 350 (Reg. Sess.,
1972) (first offense punishable by fine up to $1,000; subsequent offense punishable
by fine up to $2,000); N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW ANN. § 561 (McKinney 1968)
1972]
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PROTECTION OF RECORDS UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Since the extent of federal copyright legislation bears so directly
upon the constitutionality of state action in this area, it would be well
to consider why records could not be protected under the pre-Mc-
Clellan bill Copyright Act." Section 4 of the Copyright Act states:
"The works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall
include all the writings of an author"." Section 5 enumerates thirteen
subsections of copyrightable items for registration purposes and re-
cordings are not included in the list. However, section 5 concludes
with a provision that "the above specifications shall not be held to
limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in section 4...."D
Therefore, one can plausibly argue that recordings are encompassed
within the Act, and the language will bear this meaning. However,
despite sound arguments supporting the eligibility of records for copy-
right protection under the 1909 Act, the proposition fails, principally
because a copyright on recordings does not fit well into the pattern of
rights and duties established by the Act, or the administrative struc-
ture for enforcing them. 10
There is no doubt that a recording constitutionally qualifies as a
"writing,"' L and section 4 appears to extend protection to all con-
(misdemeanor); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4878.1 (Supp. 1973) (1st offense punishable
by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine of not more than $5,000;
subsequent offense punishable by imprisonment up to 10 years or fine up to
$20,000 or both); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4244 to -4250 (Supp. 1971) (felony; 1st
offense punishable by imprisonment for 1 to 3 years or by fine up to $25,000;
subsequent offense punishable by 3 to 10 years imprisonment or fine up to $100,000
or both); TExAs PENAL CODE ANN., art. 1137r (Supp. 1972) (Ist offense - mis-
demeanor punishable by fine up to $2,000; 2nd offense - felony punishable by
fine up to $25,000 or imprisonment up to 5 years or both); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-41,1
to 41.6 (Supp. 1972) (misdemeanor). Los Angeles had a municipal ordinance pro-
hibiting the unauthorized manufacture or sale of duplicate recordings. Los ANGELES,
CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 42.19.1 (1955). This provision was superseded by the state
statute, and the section was repealed by Ord. No. 140,388 effective June 28, 1970,
Los ANGELES, CAL. MUNICn'AL CODE (1970).
6. Prosecutions have been brought and convictions obtained in at least
Arkansas, California, Florida, New York, Tennessee, and Texas.
7. 17 U.S.C. § I et. seq. (1970).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
10. See Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1111-12 (1959); Chafee,
Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 11, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719, 735 (1945).
11. See, e.g., Note, Study of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of
thi Constitution, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1956); Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680,
[Vol. 5:204
SOUND RECORDINGS
stitutionally protectible works. Section 5 can be viewed as only an
illustrative listing of the products eligible for copyright and as a guide
in the classification of these products for registration purposes. Fur-
thermore, interpreting writings in Section 4 as coterminous with
Congress' constitutional authority to protect intellectual products
would introduce flexibility into the Act and permit the law to adapt
itself to changing methods of communication. Admittedly, the legis-
lative history of section l(e) of the 1909 Act may be read to render
records ineligible for copyright. However, alternative readings are
permissible. The committee report stated: "It is not the intention of
the committee to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical re-
productions themselves but only to give the composer or copyright
proprietor the control in accordance with the provisions of the bill of
the manufacture and use of such devices."' 2 Clearly this sentence could
be read to mean that copyright protection of recordings would be
inconsistent with the congressional purpose. Yet in the context of the
issue addressed by section l(e), one can strongly argue that the com-
mittee meant that Congress did not desire to permit the composer to
copyright recordings but only to provide the composer with limited
control of recordings as part of his underlying copyright in the sheet
music. In other words, the passage does not address the question of
whether an artist or record company, rather than the composer,
should have any rights in the recordings they produce.13
A second argument that has been raised against coverage of records
under the Copyright Act is based upon the supposition that at the
time of the Act's passage in 1909 performances were not yet being
recorded. Therefore, a statute enacted that year could not have in-
cluded protection for recording.14 This argument neither is persua-
sive on its facts nor its reasoning. Virtuosi were recording perform-
ances prior to 1909.15 Even if this were not the fact, it may be argued
H.R. 6831 and H.R. 6835 Before Subcomin. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 3. at 1863 (1965) (remarks of Abraham Kamin-
stein, Register of Copyrights).
12. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
13. Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in the De-
velopment of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444.
1466 (1971); see Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol Records
Case, 69 HAmv. L. REv. 409, 414 n. 22 (1956).
14. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.. 221 F.2d 657, 667, (2d
Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
15. See R. GELATr, THE FABULOUS PHoNoGRAPH (1955).
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that the congressional puripose is better served by an interpretation
which permits the term "writing" to be redefined in accordance with
economic and technological changes.1"
The decisive factor mitigating against interpreting the Copyright
Act to authorize copyright protection for records is the absence of any
basis in the Act to delimit and administer an appropriate scope of
protection for records.17 Conceivably, certain details might be handled
by stretching the statutory language. Thus, the notice requirement
may be satisfied by notations on the record label. But other serious
conflicts are not so easily resolved. In particular, it is unclear how the
recording copyright would be integrated with the compulsory license
mechanical reproduction section applicable to the underlying com-
position. To use Professor Fuller's apt metaphor, a construction
recognizing a copyright in recordings would conflict with the "inten-
tion of the design."' 8 In addition, such a construction would give rise
to what Professor Chafee has termed the problem of "wide range."ID
That is, different writings may require different degrees of protection,
and the protective scheme for recordings should be tailored to the
characteristics of these works. A construction placing recordings
under the 1909 Act is likely to result in excessive and unsuitable
protection.
With a single exception, the cases have reached the same conclusion.
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.20 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit decided that recordings were excluded
from copyright under the Act even though capable of copyright under
the Constitution.21 Since then, it has been uniformly assumed that
16. In other words, it is questionable whether the historical claim is relevant
to the issue of statutory construction at all, for one central issue is whether the
congressional purpose is better served by an interpretation which attributes to the
term "writing" a fixed or a dynamic, changed meaning over time. See generally
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL. PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1212-17 (tent. ed. 1958).
17. Chafee, supra note 10, at 735; see Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 665 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
18. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 83-87 (1964). See generally P. MISHKIN
& C. MORRIS, ON LAw IN COURTS 391 (1965). For elaboration, in the constitutional
context, of the "'structural" method of interpretation which forces attention to
considerations of structural and relational properties, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), especially ch. I, "Inference from
Structure: The Neglected Method."
19. Chafee, supra note 10, at 737.
20. 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
21. A word can, of course, have a different meaning when used in a statute
[Vol. 5:204
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prior to the McClellan amendment recordings were not statutorily
copyrightable and that Section 4 does not expend Congress' entire
constitutional grant 22- The Copyright Office regulations explicitly
state that the Office would not register claims to rights in recordings.2 3
The only case contra is Fonotopia Ltd. v. Bradley where the court
stated, in dictum, that records would be copyrightable under the
Act.24
Some recordings did receive a measure of protection under the
Copyright Act prior to passage of the McClellan bill. Sections l(c)
and l(d) give an exclusive right to the copyright proprietor in a non-
dramatic literary work and a dramatic work respectively "to make or
procure the making of any transcription or record thereof. . ."2 Thus
a record of a copyrighted poem or play may not be duplicated without
the permission of the proprietor of the copyright on the underlying
poem or drama, and if an unauthorized duplicate is produced it con-
stitutes an infringement of the copyright.2 6 Furthermore, unauthorized
duplication of recordings constitutes a violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.27 However, the FTC has apparently
concluded, quite correctly, that in most instances private action is
preferable to regulation by the Commission. The position of the FTC
staff is that if copies are of equal quality to the originals and are
offered at competitive prices, unauthorized duplication has little ad-
verse effect upon consumer interests, and therefore private remedies
are the appropriate means for obtaining redress. A multiplicity of
case-by-case proceedings before the Commission, it is thought, would
represent a very inefficient enforcement approach.28
than when used in the Constitution. Compare B. BrrrKmE & L. STONE, FEDmAL
INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 38 (4th ed. 1972) (use of the term "income" in
the Internal Revenue Code and the sixteenth amendment).
22. E.g., Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings in I
COPYIGHT SocIErY oF THE U.S.A., STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 123-25 (Arthur Fisher
mem. ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT]; 1 M. NIstN.ISE COPY-
RIGHT § 35.21 (1972).
23. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b) (1972).
24. 171 F. 951, 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). At the time Fonotipia was decided the Cop.
right Act had been enacted but was not yet in effect. The court's dictim was not
followed in subsequent cases.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c),(d) (1970).
26. See Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 15
VAND. L. REv. 419, 424 (1962).
27. See FTC v. Orient Music Roll Co., 2 F.T.C. 176 (1919) (unauthorized dupli-
cation of piano rolls).
28. Letter from Carl D. Hevener, Attorney. Bureau of Competition. Federal
Trade Commission, to Lewis Kurlantzick, Oct. 27, 1972.
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With the passage of the McClellan amendment the relationship
between federal and state protection of recordings would seem to be
that any recording fixed and published after February 15, 1972 is
entitled to federal protection and only to federal protection. For pre-
February 15, 1972 recordings, state law is the sole source of protec-
tion.29 With respect to records produced after February 15, 1972,
passage of the McClellan amendment would seem to pre-empt state
law prohibiting unauthorized duplication. Such pre-emption is made
explicit under the revision bill, which abolishes any rights which are
equivalent to copyright and which extend to works coming within
the scope of the copyright law.30 The argument that state laws supple-
ment rather than conflict with the federal statute is unpersuasive. In
fact, the states recognized the need for federal legislation and reluct-
antly filled the void they perceived. In New York, for example, Gov-
ernor Dewey twice vetoed anti-piracy statutes in the 1950's on the
belief that relief from piracy should appropriately come through
federal legislation.31 Moreover, pre-emption here does not involve the
frustration of any significant "local" objective. The need for uniform
nationwide protection in the record industry is clear.32 The Copy-
right Act, a compendious statute in a narrow field, fulfills this need.
The state laws do not and, in addition, are in conflict with the federal
enactment in several respects. One key conflict centers on the dura-
tion of protection. The federal statute grants a twenty-eight year term
with a permissible twenty-eight year extension, while the state statutes
contain no time limitation and thereby conflict with the monopoly-
competition balance struck by Congress33 The Copyright Act also pro-
vides for formal notice and registration requirements which are ab-
sent from the state laws. Even if the state statutes and the Copyright
Act were not viewed as conflicting, the conclusion of displacement of
state law by paramount federal law here is in line with the funda-
29. The McClellan bill expires at the end of 1974, and therefore only covers
recordings fixed and published between February 15, 1972 and the date of expira-
tion. The copyright revision bill would provide permanent coverage for recordings.
If the McClellan bill expires without being extended and the revision bill is not
enacted, recordings produced after the expiration date would again have to look
to state law for protection.
30. S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(a) (1971).
31. Billboard, Aug. 7, 1954, at 18.
32. See pp. 236-38 infra.
33. See pp. 222-28 inIra.
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mental thrust of Wheaton v. Peters34 and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. ' against permitting state supplementation of the federal
protective scheme. Once a statutory copyright is obtained, the Act
fully controls.3 6 Of course, if the states are constitutionally precluded
from protecting records made prior to February 15, 1972, a fortiori
they cannot protect records made after that date.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Sears-Compco and the " Copying-Appropriation" Distinction
Judicial consideration of the appropriate boundaries between the
power of the federal and state governments in this area has pivoted
about the Supreme Court decisions in the companion cases of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.37 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc. Although both these cases involved the patent laws, there
is no doubt that the Court's reasoning also applies to copyright tm In
Sears, the plaintiff, Stiffel Co., a manufacturer and designer of lamps,
had obtained mechanical and design patents on a pole lamp. After
the lamp had become popular, Sears began to market a substantially
identical lamp at a lower price. Stiffel brought suit in federal district
court alleging patent infringement and unfair competition. The dis-
trict court invalidated Stiffel's patents for failure to meet the patent
statute's standards for invention. However, the court deemed Sears'
lamp to be a substantially exact copy of Stiffers, and found that con-
fusion between the two was likely and that some confusion had
already occurred. Applying Illinois law, the court enjoined Sears from
selling lamps identical or confusingly similar to Stiffel's and ordered
34. 38 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
35. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
36. See generally Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408. 98 Eng. Rep. 257. 2 Brown.
Parl. Cas. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
The conclusion that the states cannot protect post-February 15, 1972 record-
ings is accepted by most record company lawyers. The only case which has con-
sidered the issue agreed with this concusion and held the Florida anti.piracy
statute unconstitutional under the supremacy clause as in conflict with the Copy-
right Act. Int'l. Tape Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Gerstein. 174 U.S.P.Q. 198, 208-10 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
37. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
38. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
39. In its opinions the Court specifically mentions copyright and refers to both
the patent and copyright schemes as components of the competition-monopoly
balance struck by the Constitution and by Congress. E.g., 376 U.S. 229. 231 n.7.
232-33, 237.
1972]
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an accounting for profits and damages.40 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that Stiffel had proved a sufficient like-
lihood of confusion among customers as to the source of the Sears
lamp.41
The Supreme Court reversed. 42 In a sweeping opinion the Court
held that the lower court injunction conflicted with the federal patent
system in that states cannot protect from copying a product design
which does not meet the federal statutory requirement of inventive-
ness. State protection in such a situation would undermine the com-
petition-monopoly balance struck by Congress in the patent laws by
creating a monopoly where the federal policy balance declares that
none should exist.4 3 The Sears-Compco opinions do not clearly indi-
cate the extent to which the pre-emption of state law is based on the
Constitution, the extent to which it is based on the federal copyright
and patent statutes, and the exact scope of the pre-emption. Sears
itself dealt with a work which was covered by the patent statute as to
type but which failed to qualify for protection under the statutory
standards. The question remains as to whether Sears applies inferen-
tially to the case where the work, though constitutionally copyright-
able, is not covered by the statute, i.e., the situation of sound record-
40. The district court proceeding is unreported. The court's action is sum-
marized in the opinions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court.
41. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
42. Although in both Sears and Compco the evidence did not clearly support
the district court findings of confusion and likelihood of confusion, the Supreme
Court chose not to reverse on this ground. Similarly both the district courts and
the Seventh Circuit perceived a liberalization in the Illinois law of unfair competi-
tion in that the traditional notion that a product design must have obtained a
secondary meaning indicating its source to buyers was thought to have been re-
placed by a less exacting standard of likely customer confusion. Id. at 118 and n.7;
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 29-30 (7th Cir. 1963). Al-
though the Supreme Court was highly dubious of the Seventh Circuit's reading of
Illinois unfair competition law, it (lid not rely on this possible misreading by the
appellate court for its reversal.
43. The issues and decisions in Compco were similar to those in Sears. Day-Brite
had obtained a design patent on its reflectors for commercial fluorescent lighting
fixtures. The district court held the patent invalid, but granted an injunction
against the manufacture and sale of identical or confusingly similar reflectors on
the basis of a tenuous extension of Illinois unfair competition law. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir.
1963), and the Supreme Court reversed, holding as in Sears, that state law could
not prohibit the copying of the design of goods unprotected by federal design
patent. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The rulings
on invalidity of the patents were not contested in the Supreme Court in either
Sears or Compco.
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ings. The duplicators, of course, have argued that the answer to this
question is "yes." State law, they maintain, cannot extend the equiv-
alent of copyright protection to any copyrightable article that Con-
gress has not protected." With one exception, the courts have dis-
agreed, though they have given the question little sustained analysis.
Although the Sears and Compco decisions may be read as prohib-
iting state protection of uncopyrightable records, state and lower
federal court decisions since Sears have consistently refused to hold
that the states are constitutionally precluded from acting against
duplicators under state civil or criminal law.45 The courts usually
have justified their decisions by a purported legally significant dis-
tinction between the factual situation in Sears and that in record
piracy cases. Allegedly, Sears was an instance of "copying" while un-
authorized duplication involves "misappropriation."4 6 Apparently
the distinction is that "appropriation" is the use of "the identical
product" itself. That is, the record copier improperly uses more of
the original producer's investment than does the design copier. This
distinction is untenable. Sears can just as well be regarded as an
example of "appropriation" as of "copying." Had Sears purchased
a Stiffel lamp, created a master mold from the Stiffel product, and
then reproduced duplicates (which may have been what actually
happened) the Court's decision would have been the same. Similarly,
since the record copier produces and sells his own record, he only
44. E.g., Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10-18, Goldstein v. California, cert.
granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972). The Justice Department apparently agrees with the
duplicators' reading of Sears. Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1971) (letter from
Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to Congressman Celler, June 29, 1971).
45. E.g., Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d
414, appeal dismissed, 278 N.C. 702, 181 S.E.2d 600 (1971); Tape Industries Ass'n.
of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401
U.S. 902 (1971) appeal docketed, No. 26-628, 9th Cir., Oct. 22, 1970; Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 2d District 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970). One case has refused to accept the "copying-
misappropriation" distinction as a limit on the impact of Sears. In International
Tape Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Gerstein, 394 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Fla. 1972) a federal judge held
the Florida anti-piracy statute unconstitutional.
46. While the courts speak of "appropriation" as a form of "taking" or "con-
verting", neither "appropriation" nor "copying" involves any interference with a
possessory interest. In both the Sears sequence and in record piracy what is "taken"
is an intangible, whether it is the combination of lines and forms which constitutes
a lamp design or the combination of sounds which constitutes an artist's perform-
ance. See Note, The Future of Record Piracy, 38 BRoox.YN L. Rnv. 406, 415-16
(1971).
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"appropriates" the combination of sounds underlying the record, just
as the design copier makes his own lamp by appropriating the com-
bination of lines and forms underlying the lamp. The design copier
in actually producing the lamp has the same production costs as the
original designer. It may be that the record copier obtains an addi-
tional cost advantage over the original producer in that he not only
uses the original producer's "ideas," but he need not hire musicians
and engineers to execute the idea. But this only adds to the economic
disadvantages of the original producer vis-a-vis the copier and is only
relevant to the need for and extent of the protection required by
record producers. It says nothing about the appropriate division of
jurisdiction over these matters between the states and the federal
government.
In considering the extent of federal preemption there seems to be
no ground for distinguishing between state civil tort law and state
criminal law. The validity of state regulation in relation to the fed-
eral copyright scheme should not turn on whether the prohibition
emanates from a state's legislature or its courts. Moreover, where state
protection is the equivalent of copyright, in that it prohibits duplica-
tion and creates a monopoly valid against the world, the name given
by the state to the theory of protection - whether "misappropriation,"
"common law copyright," "unjust enrichment," "interference with
contractual relations," or something else-should be irrelevant. Dupli-
cators have argued that both civil and criminal actions against them
are constitutionally precluded.
Unfortunately, reliance on the copying-misappropriation distinc-
tion has permitted the courts to avoid the difficult textual and policy
issues involved in setting the limits of federal and state competence
over works within the reach of the copyright clause.47 The courts in
record piracy cases simply have failed to analyze the relationship be-
tween the Constitution, the Copyright Act, and the theories support-
ing state action. Perhaps the copying-misappropriation distinction
has been motivated by a judicial distaste for record copying in a con-
text where the alternative to limiting Sears may be no relief at all
47. For cogent criticism of the "copying-appropriation" distinction, see Note,
The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in the Development of
the Sears-Compco Preemption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (1971); 1 M.
NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 35.224 (1972); Nimmer, Copyright and Quasi-Copyright
Protection for Characters, Titles and Phonograph Records, 59 TRADEMARK REP.
63, 74 (1969).
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against unauthorized duplication. We are left to guesswork here since
the courts which speak of "copying" and "appropriation" or equiv-
alent distinctions have not attempted to explain the significance of
these supposed distinctions in terms of any applicable policy.
Total Preemption: The Copyright Clause and Learned Hand
Does the Constitution by itself impose any limits on state power
over recordings? Learned Hand has made the most forceful case for
the position that authority over "published" "writings" is vested ex-
clusively in the federal government.4s This exclusive jurisdiction is
necessary, he argued, in order to comply with the constitutional re-
quirements that copyright protection be granted for "limited times"
and be nationally uniform. Hand maintained that the copyright
dause's "limited times" restriction should be regarded as a limitation
with which both state and federal protection must comply.40 He
opposed perpetual state protection of writings not covered by the
Copyright Act. Such protection, he thought, would discriminate
against writings which are covered by the Act and which are therefore
subject to the Act's limited term.50 To insure against the possibility
of perpetual state protection Hand limited state protection to un-
published writings with the definition of "publication" deemed a
federal question. These objectives, however, could be effectuated by
subjecting state protection to the constitutional limits on duration.
Any particular state time limit, for example, might be subject to
federal judicial supervision. Or the aim of restricting the duration of
protection might be realized by having Congress impose a specific
time limit on state protection of "writings" which are not statutorily
copyrightable. The Constitution would then limit the content of state
law without precluding all state power in the area.
Hand, however, interpreted the copyright clause to require national
uniformity, and he therefore would bar state protection of published
48. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d
Cir. 1955) (dissenting opinion). For a succinct summary of Hand's position and its
premises, see Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Colyright Interest. 69
COLUm. L. REv. 49, 51-53 (1969).
49. U.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 8:
The Congress shall have Power . .. To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
50. See, e.g., Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80,
82 (2d Cir. 1940), afrd. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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"writings" not covered by the Copyright Act even if that protection
were for a limited time. This policy of national uniformity would
prohibit state protection, with its potential for divergent rules among
the states, even if the policy in favor of eventual dedication of pub-
lished "writings" were fulfilled. Hand also believed the Copyright
Act to be a comprehensive, consciously ordered scheme and that any
omission from its coverage must be viewed "to have been as deliberate
as though it were expressed. 51
While Hand is correct in desiring a limited, uniform, post-publica-
tion monopoly and parity between "writings" protected under the
Act and those protected by state law, he goes too far in insisting that
the Constitution requires a unitary source for protection where
"published" works within the copyright clause are concerned. Hand
interprets the constitutional grant of copyright power to Congress as
precluding concurrent state power. Generally, however, the vesting
of a power in Congress does not automatically operate to exclude
state power in that area. Rather, it usually has the effect of making
the area one of concurrent federal and state power.52 While the com-
merce clause, for example, by its own force and in the absence of
congressional action, does preclude certain exercises of state power,
normally absolute restrictions on state power stem from explicit con-
stitutional prohibitions and not merely the negative implication aris-
ing from a substantive grant to Congress.5 3 In addition, there is a
growing tendency to look to the supremacy clause and the substantive
policies behind the implementing statutes to determine the existence
and scope of federal pre-emption rather than relying on the effect of
the constitutional grant of power itself.54 It is important to remember,
51. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930). For criticism of this argument ania its variants as applied to
recordings, see pp. 228-30 infra.
52. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
53. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 497, 525-26 (1954). While the Constitution does explicitly deprive the states
of jurisdiction over certain matters, such as coining of money, art. I, § 10, generally
it is concerned with delegating powers to the federal government rather than limit-
ing state powers.
54. See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc.
tion, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959). To the extent preemption questions are decided
solely on the fact that Congress has been granted authority in a particular area,
the division of power between the states and the federal government becomes very
mechanical. Generally protection of federal objectives from state interference
through a limitation inferred from a federal statute rather than by a negative
implication arising from the constitutional grant of substantive power has a num-
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though, that often the Court is governed less by canons of construc-
don than by philosophic moods,m5 and the mood reflected in Sears
seems to be a strongly anti-monopoly one which views patents and
copyrights as singular, limited exceptions to the dominant rule of
competition.
A further difficulty with Hand's position is that he insists only on
exclusive federal authority over published "writings"; unpublished
works can be protected by state law. This is consistent with Hand's
greater concern over excess protection of published rather than un-
published works.5 6 But the Constitution speaks of "Writings" with
no distinction between published and unpublished works. Congress,
in fact, has exercised this power with respect to a limited class of
unpublished works.57 Yet Hand does not challenge the general as-
ber of advantages. This approach provides greater flexibility in that Congress
always has the opportunity to accept or reject judicial decisions by explicitly ex-
panding or contracting state jurisdiction, in accordance with Congress' superior
capacity to assess the nature and degree of harm to federal concerns that anv
particular state action might entail.
55. P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrD STATFs 18-19 (1961).
56. Since publication has a direct effect upon an artist's privacy and reputation,
it seems appropriate to give a writer or musician unlimited control over unpub-
lished works, at least during his lifetime. Upon publication, though, the artist's
interests are largely economic. Therefore the nature and extent of protection against
unauthorized duplication legitimately may be limited by concern for the com-
petitive and social effects of such protection.
57. 17 U.S.C. §12 (1970): "Copyright may also be had of the works of an author,
of which copies are not reproduced for sale, by the deposit, with claim of copy-
right, of one complete copy of such work if it be a lecture or similar production
or a dramatic, musical, or dramatico-musical composition; of a title and description,
with one print taken from each scene or act, if the work be a motion-picture
photoplay; of a photographic print if the work be a photograph; of a title and
description, with not less than two prints taken from different sections of a com-
plete motion picture, if the work be a motion picture other than a photoplay; or
of a photograph or other identifying reproduction thereof, if it be a work of art
or a plastic work or drawing."
If the term "Writings" in the copyright clause is limited to published works.
section 12 is unconstitutional unless saved by the "necessary and proper" clause or
the commerce clause. Similarly, the plan of the revision bill to replace state law
protection with federal protection from the time of creation would be unconstitu-
tional.
A reading of the Constitution which construed "Writings" as published works
and limited exclusive federal authority to published works would not be inherently
irrational or unworkable. Congress still would be able to afford some protection
to unpublished works under the "necessary and proper" clause or the commerce
clause. Moreover, if the framers had any model in mind it was probably that of
the literary manuscript, unpublished while in the writer's possession, published
when printed and sold; and they may have thought that federal regulation was
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sumption that the states can protect unpublished works.5s Indeed,
section 2 of the Copyright Act explicitly acknowledges state power
over unpublished works5 9 If states can protect unpublished works
necessary only when the book left the author's hands. The restriction of the
monopoly to a limited period is most appropriate for a published work, and
significantly less so for unpublished works, which are so closely tied to the author's
persona. However, lawyers in 1787 were acquainted with the importance of pub-
lication in copyright law, and the failure to use the word in the copyright clause
may be argued to prove that no constitutional distinction exists between published
and unpublished works. See Kaplan, Performer's Right and Copyright: The Capitol
Records Case, 69 HARV. L. REV. 409, 423, nn. 52-53 (1956).
58. There exists a substantial body of state common and statutory law dealing
with unpublished works. See, e.g., Strauss, Protection o Unpublished Works, in
1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 189; United States of America: Items 49-65, 2 UNESCO
Copyright Laws & Treaties of the World (1971).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970): "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or
limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common
law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished
work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor." Section 2 of the Copy-
right Act can be interpreted either to undermine or to support state jurisdiction
over unpublished works. One might view section 2 as an instance of congressional
validation of a state practice which would violate the copyright clause in the
absence of congressional permission. In other words, section 2 might be viewed as
an instance of a congressional grant of jurisdiction to the states in an area where
the state jurisdiction requires explicit congressional permission. There is precedent
for such congressional regulation by permissive sanction to the states in the context
of the commerce clause. While this technique has presented theoretical difficulties,
there is now no doubt that Congress may authorize the states to act upon interstate
commerce in ways that would be held to be precluded in the silence of Congress.
P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES; I B. SCHWARTZ, A Coto-
MENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 278-81, 318-20 (1963).
However, section 2 has never been interpreted as the source of state power
over unpublished writings. On the contrary, it seems to be a disclaimer of any
intention to preempt state common law protection of unpublished works. Thus,
rather than denying inherent state power to protect unpublished writings, section
2 implies that prior to its enactment the states enjoyed such power and passage of
the Copyright Act was not intended to alter this situation. See H.R. Rep. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909). Every general copyright statute enacted by Congress
from the first law of 1790 down to, but not including, the Act of 1909 granted a
federal right of action for unauthorized printing or publishing of a manuscript.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 125; Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat.
438; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 102, 16 Stat. 215; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565,
§ 9, 26 Star. 1109. In enforcing this sratutory remedy, the courts have never indi-
cated that the federal law supplanted the power of the states to enforce an author's
common law copyright in his manuscript. Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196
(2d Cir.), appeal dismissed for lack of a federal question, 164 U.S. 105 (1896);
Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872); Kortlander v. Bradford, 116 Misc. 664, 190
N.Y.S. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1921); J. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett, in
THE CREATIvE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 160-62 (1965). Section 12 of the
present Copyright Act also seems to assume the existence of concurrent state power
over unpublished writings. See generally Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law:
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despite federal copyright power over such writings, why cannot they
protect published writings as well? Conceivably, the position against
state copyright authority over published works may be defended by
drawing a distinction between different legal concepts for protecting
artistic products. Thus, the state's power to protect unpublished
works is designed to insure that the author retains full right to decide
whether or not to release his work to the public. This interest might
be distinguished from that underlying copyright protection, which is
aimed at protecting the author's economic interest in the reproduc-
tion and distribution of the work.6 0 Under this analysis the existence
of state common law protection of unpublished works does not neces-
sarily imply the power to provide copyright protection to published
works.
Finally, Hand's recognition of the desirability of a uniform nation-
wide rule governing intellectual property does not support his con-
clusion that the copyright clause itself precludes state protection. In
finding a preemptive policy of uniformity inherent in the clause,
Hand relied, in large part, on Madison's cryptic justification of the
copyright power in The Federalist Papers. "The states," Madison ob-
served, "cannot separately make effectual provision for [copyright]." 1
The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469. 477-79 (1955).
It is impossible, however, to resolve the issue solely by textual exegesis. If
one accepts the distinction between common law and copyright interests and
remedies, section 2 may be read as Congress' desire to clarify its intention not to
disturb state common law protection of unpublished works. Another possibility,
of course, is that even if Congress did believe the states retained jurisdiction over
unpublished works, it was in error, and the courts, not Congress. are the Con-
stitution's final arbiter.
60. See p. 224 infra.
61. THE FEDERAST No. 43 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The limited
research which has been done on the history and meaning of the copyright clause
provides little illumination on our question. See, e.g.. B. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); Fenning, The Origin of the Patent
and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929). In a speech
shortly before the Constitutional Convention Madison criticized the Articles of
Confederation for their lack of provision for national protection for authors. He
noted the state governments' "want of concert in matters where common interest
requires it." Under this heading he deplored the "want of uniformity in the laws
concerning ...literary property .... ." Observations by J. M., April 1787 in 4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HisTOry OF THE CONSTITUTION OF TE UNITED
STATEs OF AMERIcA 128 (1905). Story viewed the question whether the cop)right
power was "exclusive" or "concurrent" as a "matter for grave inquiry." J. STORY,
2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1154. at 84 (5th ed.
1891). Curtis expressed similar doubts in his copyright treatise: "Whether this
power is exclusive so that the states cannot now legislate for the protection of
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The difficulty Madison refers to is the lack of power to grant effective
protection due to limited state jurisdiction.0 2 To remedy this problem
it is sufficient to grant Congress power to enact copyright legislation.
It is not necessary to withdraw from the states all power to protect
writings. Although some limitations on state power may be appro-
priate, there is little warrant for a blanket prohibition, and there is
no evidence that Madison proposed such a prohibition. Moreover,
the copyright clause should not be read as being concerned with sav-
ing the states from exercises in futility. That is, absent congressional
action with respect to a category of "writings," the clause should not
be interpreted as itself forbidding a state to regulate that category
even though such state protection might prove ineffective. The record
companies, of course, are quite willing to live with the "burdens"
which the limitations of state law impose. Furthermore, if particular
state laws prove to unduly fractionize the national market or to dis-
criminate in favor of local industries, judges may apply the commerce
clause to invalidate such exercises of state power.03
THE "LIMITED TIMEs" REQUIREMENT
Though the copyright clause need not be interpreted to bar all
state action with respect to the protection of writings, certain forms
of state protection are precluded. The Constitution permits Congress
to grant exclusive rights to intellectual works only for "limited times"
and this limitation may be argued to apply to the states as well as the
federal government. Three positions are possible: the limited times
provision does not apply to the states; the provision does apply; the
applicability of the provision to the states may be determined by
Congress. Both the language and purpose of the copyright clause point
towards the second choice; the limited times provision applies to any
authors within their own limits, is one of the grave questions of our complex sys-
tem of government." G. CURTIS. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 82 (1847).
An interesting early essay on the question of whether the copyright power is
"exclusive" is contained in an article, On Literary Property, THE NEW YORK RE-
VIEW, April 1839, at 276-91.
62. See J. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett, in THE CREATIVE ARTS
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 155-57 (1965).
63. It should be noted that the Constitution does contain express requirements
of uniformity in relation to the taxing, naturalization, and bankruptcy powers,
and of equality of treatment in the regulation of ports. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, 4; § 9, cl. 6.
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state or federal action designed to protect subject matter covered by
the copyright clause.
The protective scheme established by the copyright clause, and
incorporated in all federal copyright and patent legislation, attempts
to strike a balance between providing incentives to inventors, writers
and artists through protection of their intellectual efforts and ensur-
ing maximum dissemination of their work. The essential purpose and
justification of copyright protection is to stimulate intellectual and
artistic expression by providing sufficient incentives to authors and
distributors.6 The federal Copyright Act attempts to accomplish this
by giving authors and composers control over the use of their prod-
ucts. Such control raises the prices of these works and otherwise re-
duces their dissemination with the attendant loss of direct and spill-
over benefits incident to maximum dissemination of ideas. Therefore,
protection which might reduce public access to works should be
limited to that level of protection necessary to induce the desired level
of intellectual effort. This is particularly true in the case of literary
and artistic works where restrictions on reproduction and distribution
invoke first amendment concerns. This policy is recognized by the
constitutional provision which grants Congress authority to protect
intellectual works for "limited times." Given the constitutional con-
cern with excess protection, state power in this area should be subject
to similar limitations, since excessive state protection imposes the
same unjustifiable costs as would excessive federal protection.0
64. See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. RE%,. 281 (1970). The
only persuasive reason for copyright is the economic one; protection is necessary
in order to induce production. As Professor Breyer has shown in the context of book
publishing, and as will be demonstrated in the author's comprehensive article
on record production, the other arguments - particularly the "moral" entitlement
of an author to the "fruits of his labor" and the necessity to protect an author's
dignitary interests - do not justify a copyright system.
65. Perpetual protection of recordings is particularly inapt since the bulk of
record sales are made within a relatively short period after their issuance. Most
popular records are sold within the first three months after release. and companies
normally base their production decisions on the expectation that the earnings of a
popular recording will be achieved within one to two years. It is unlikely that
problematical receipts from sales beyond this period enter into their budgetary
calculations. Companies do engage in somewhat longer term planning with respect
to classical records. Even classical releases, though, are expected to earn a return
within five to ten years. Thus a relatively short term of protection for recordings,
such as ten years, should satisfy the inducement or incentive rationale for copy-
right protection.
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However, the right of states to provide temporally unlimited pro-
tection of intellectual works might be justified by asserting that state
power in this area antedated the Constitution and therefore is not
subject to the limited times restriction of the copyright clause. Al-
though the states undoubtedly do retain much of their preconstitu-
tional authority, this argument is unsound here for two reasons: there
were no significant state attempts to provide copyright protection for
published works prior to the Constitution, and preconstitutional
forms of protection should be subject to the overriding constitutional
policy against unlimited protection. The copyright clause and Copy-
right Act of 1790 represented the first substantial and effective
American attempt to give the creator of an intellectual product con-
trol over unauthorized reproduction of his work. Except for an iso-
lated instance of statutory protection in Massachusetts, copyright in
published works was not secured by law in colonial America.00 More-
over, the state statutes passed under the Articles of Confederation
existed for less than a decade before being supplanted by the Act of
1790, and some of them by their own terms never became operative.
Indeed, the explicit assumption of the Supreme Court in the land-
mark case of Wheaton v. Peters was that common law copyright pro-
tection of published works had never been adopted by any of the
states and that Congress in the 1790 Act did not sanction an existing
right but rather created a new one. 7 Since federal recognition of a
right to control reproduction was not a continuation of traditional
common law protection of tort and property interests, there is no
basis for claiming preconstitutional state authority over copyright
which can continue, free of the limited times policy of the copyright
clause.68
66. See L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 183 (1968); B.
BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 65-67, 106 (1967).
67. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 214-15 (1954).
68. One scholar has argued that interstate protection of author's rights by
federal legislation constitutes extraordinary relief and therefore requires a time
restriction, whereas state protection represents ordinary relief and therefore calls
for no such restriction. See Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett, in THE
CREATIVE ARTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESs 159 (1965). The argument is not persua-
sive. To the extent state protection is effective, it imposes the same kind of costs
as federal protection. Moreover, if state protection is widespread, as it is in the
case of recordings, it is difficult to see a significant difference in the extent or
character of relief unless one is prepared to argue that protection by a single state
dictates a different result than protection by a large number of states. Therefore,
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Following the theme established by the courts in allocating federal
and state power under the commerce clause, it has been suggested
that the limited times policy should apply to the states unless Con-
gress explicitly authorizes perpetual state protection.'0 True, Congress
apparently has authorized perpetual state protection of unpublished
works7o But Congress has not authorized the states to accord per-
petual protection to published works; therefore existing state laws
against record duplication, none of which are limited in time, would
be unconstitutional under this approach. More fundamentally, it is
very difficult to imagine that Congress can authorize the states to
extend temporally unlimited protection when the copyright clause
expressly prohibits Congress from doing it. The constitutional policy
opposing unlimited protection is too clearly enunciated to permit
avoidance through congressionally authorized state action.71
The reasoning supporting the application of the limited time re-
striction to state protection of published writings leads to the con-
clusion that the limited times policy applies to the protection of
unpublished writings as well. This result is not as radical as might
first appear. Although it has been widely assumed that protection of
unpublished works is theoretically perpetual, the proposition has
never been tested, at least in the sense that rarely, if ever, has a suit
been brought to restrain publication of an unpublished work a very
long time after the author's death.72 Even if the limited time restric-
tion does apply to unpublished works, the states still would be
able to afford extensive protection to such works. And in light of the
different interests which may be involved, the states should be able
to extend longer protection to unpublished than to published works.
Certainly they could protect unpublished works for at least as long
the same considerations that underlie the limited times policy of the copyright
dause should apply to state copyright remedies.
69. Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in the
Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 CoLu.t. L. REv. 1444.
1467 (1971): "[U]nless Congress has expressly announced - as it has with respect
to common law copyright protection of unpublished works - that perpetual state
protection is not undesirable, a federal policy against such permanent monopolist
privileges ought to be prima facie operative .... "
70. See 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); pp. 219-21 & note 59 supra and pp. 225-27 infra.
71. Moreover, unlike commerce clause cases where ordinary state police powers
are involved, copyright protection is not a traditional state power.
72. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135. 89 N.E.d 863 (1949) (39
years after author's death).
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as the period provided by the applicable federal copyright act.7:I In
addition, privacy rights may survive the constitutional limit for copy-
right protection.74 It is unlikely that many justifiable privacy claims
will be asserted many years after the author's death.75 But in the rare
case of such a claim, a state should be able to protect the personal
interest. The copyright revision bill now being considered by Con-
gress would introduce a system whereby the same term of protection
would apply to unpublished works, to works published during the
author's lifetime, and to works published posthumously. 76 No one has
suggested that this structure is extreme.
In fact, it is hard to make a persuasive case for perpetual protec-
tion of unpublished works. Such protection, after the death of the
author and his heirs, cannot be justified as providing authors with
73. Whicher has suggested that the limited times policy may be complied with
by any statute which protects a writing from the moment of its creation until the
end of a fixed period after publication or registration. Whicher, supra note 68,
at 166-68; see Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Goldstein v. California, cert.
granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972). But see Kalodner & Vance, supra note 10, at 1083.
74. The copyright revision bill preserves state authority to act against invasions
of privacy, as well as against other activities violating rights that are not "equiv-
alent to copyright," such as breach of contract, defamation, and deceptive trade
practices. S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(b)(3) (1971). This scheme may occasion-
ally cause difficulties since vindication of the privacy right may, in certain circum-
stances, have effects similar to copyright. Unlike a breach of contract remedy,
which may deny access to a writing to a limited class, a privacy iemedy may bar
everyone from access to the work involved. However, the interest protected by the
privacy doctrine is substantively different from the copyright interest. And as long
as the states are careful not to protect an interest in economic exploitation in the
guise of a privacy claim, they should be empowered to protect personal interests
even after expiration of the constitutionally permissible period of copyright pro-
tection. Also, it may be possible to fashion the privacy remedy so that complete
prohibition of publication of the contested document is not necessary. See Gold-
stein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 49,
74-76, 90-91 (1969).
75. Generally it will be difficult for an author's heirs or other parties to make
a persuasive claim that publication will invade their own right of privacy. See,
e.g., Note, Copyright: Right to Common Law Copyright in Conversations of a
Decedent, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 369-70 (1967); Note, Personal Letters: In Need
of a Law of Their Own, 44 IOWA L. REV. 705, 712-14 (1959); Note, Property Rights
in Letters, 46 YALE L.J. 493, 503-04 (1937).
76. The revision bill replaces the present dual system, whereby unpublished
works are protected by state common law or statute and published works are pro-
tected by federal statute, with a single system of federal statutory protection for
all published and unpublished works. Generally both published and unpublished
works would be protected for a period measured by the life of the author plus
fifty years after his death. S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-302 (1971).
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an incentive to write for publication. 77 The only possible economic
justification for protection long after the author's death is that it is
necessary to provide sufficient economic incentive for the publisher.71'
The discovery of a valuable manuscript long after the author's death
rarely occurs, and it is at least questionable whether the publisher
requires a monopoly in order to induce him to publish such a work."'
Another reason for applying the limited times policy to unpublished
works is that the concept of "publication" has become distorted, and
as a result regulation is to a considerable extent no longer responsive
to economic realities. Under widely accepted decisions a work may
be widely disseminated and commercially exploited and yet still re-
main "unpublished."8 0 The suggested application of the limited times
policy would limit or nullify the significance of the definition of
"publication" and would avoid the undesirable consequences that
distortion of the term has produced.8' It also would facilitate scholar-
ship and the dissemination of historical materials by making unpub-
lished, undisseminated manuscripts available for publication after a
reasonable period.8 2
This interpretation of the limited times policy invalidates virtually
all existing state efforts to prevent record copying. Most state court
injunctions have ircorporated no time limit, and state criminal anti-
piracy statutes also contain no limit on duration of the protection.
Federal or state establishment of reproduction rights without definite
time limits is inconsistent with the constitutional copyright scheme,
77. See generally J. TAUBMAN, COPYRIGHT AND ANTrRusT 12 (1960).
78. As used here, "publisher" refers to the party who is responsible for the
commercial reproduction and distribution of the work. In the case of a book it
would be the publisher; in the case of a recording, the record company.
79. See Brejer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 302 (1970).
80. For example, public performance of a -play, no matter how often and
profitable and how large the audience, is not a publication of the drama. And it
may be that public sale of records or tapes does not publish the underlying com-
position. Thus, those who exploit their works in this manner would be entitled
to an indeterminate monopoly since their works remain "unpublished." See, e.g.,
B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW Or COPYRIGHT 83-85 (1967); Kaplan, Publication
in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph Records. 103 U. PA. L. REv. 469
(1955).
81. One of the objectives of the revision bill is to avoid the effects of this dis-
tortion and to implement the constitutional limited times policy. H.R. Rep. No.
83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 97 (1967).
82. See generally Chaffee. Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II. 45 COLUM.
L. REv. 719, 725-27 (1945).
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and therefore these creations of permanent rights should be held
unconstitutional. 83
THE EFFECT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Unfortunately Judge Hand's approach, and indeed much of the
analysis of the relationship between federal and state jurisdiction
over the protection of "writings," focuses exclusively on the copyright
clause and results in an all-or-nothing situation; either the Constitu-
tion itself precludes all state action or state power is unrestricted.
More flexible positions are ignored. The better view is that the states
are not constitutionally barred from all action, but their authority is
subject to certain limitations. We have seen that state action must
be subject to the limited times policy derived from the copyright
clause itself. In addition, state action must operate within the explicit
and implicit constraints imposed by relevant congressional enact-
ments. Under the "intermediate" approach outlined here, the copy-
right power would be treated analogously to the commerce power.
State action might be sufficiently inconsistent with the basic structure
of the copyright clause, such as the limited times policy, to render the
state law invalid. More likely, though, state laws would be judged in
terms of their consistency with the purposes of congressional enact-
ments in the copyright field. 4
Would state recognition of a right of those responsible for the pro-
duction of records to limit reproduction of their product be incon-
sistent with the provisions of the Copyright Act, particularly those
bearing on music? To date, none of the record piracy cases has con-
sidered this issue. The most obvious argument for such an incon-
sistency is the failure of Congress to protect recordings under the
Copyright Act.8 5 If the Act, as Hand thought, constitutes a compre-
83. The contention in a particular case that the records being duplicated were
made only recently and that therefore the issue of perpetual protection is not
raised should not be credited. The monopoly should be limited to a period de-
fined in advance. Otherwise there is no assurance of the eventual dedication of
the work.
While Sears essentially rested on the proposition that a state cannot provide
the equivalent of patent protection to an item which does not meet the federal
standards for patentability, the Court's opinion does reveal some stress on the
evils of protection unlimited in time.
84. See B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 92 (1967).
85. The Act contains a list of covered works, and recordings are not among
them. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). For analysis and elaboration of the accepted view that
pre-February 15, 1972 recordings are not covered by the Act, see pp. 208-11 supra.
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hensive, consciously ordered scheme, then arguably any category not
covered should go unprotected.8 6 State protection, then, would inter-
fere with the sensitive balance desired by Congress between what
must be protected and what must be left open to competition. What
the statute fails to protect it must be assumed that Congress intended
to leave unregulated. Supporters of pre-emption often supplement
this argument with a reference to the multiple, unsuccessful congres-
sional attempts to grant protection to recordings.8 7 This congressional
inaction, the argument goes, demonstrates an intention to withhold
protection from recordings.
Generally, one should not construe legislative failure to enact pro-
posed legislation as an authorative determination against such
change.88 There are many possible reasons why a bill might not be
enacted unrelated to the merits of the bill, and it is virtually impos-
sible for a court to determine the "real" reason. There is also a more
fundamental objection to granting authoritative significance to
legislative inaction. The United States Constitution establishes the
various ways to enact law. Failure to pass a bill is not one of the ways
prescribed, even when a bill has been introduced and defeated. To
conclude that failure of Congress to legislate has legislative impact
expands the permissible forms of law making beyond those set forth
in the Constitution, thereby negating the relevance of the constitu-
tionally prescribed legislative procedures.
However, it may be legitimate to draw inferences in situations
where a comprehensive legislative scheme fails to regulate certain
areas relevant to that scheme. Thus, there may be merit in the argu-
ment that the Copyright Act's omission of recordings from the list of
covered works implies a congressional desire to permit record copying,
thereby precluding state protection. Assuming, however, that there
are occasions where an omission from a compendious federal enact-
ment should be taken to preclude state action with respect to the
omitted category, the omission of recordings from the 1909 Act does
not represent such an occasion. The Act cannot be fairly characterized
86. See p. 218 and note 51 supra.
87. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 10-11. Goldstein v. California, cert. granted.
406 US. 956 (1972).
88. Hart, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INsTrrtmoNs TODAY
AND ToMoRRoW 45-48 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959) ('the fallacy of legislating by not
legislating"). See H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL Pnocus: BAsic PROBLESS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1395-97 (tent. ed. 1958).
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as representing a congressional choice between the competing objec-
tives of maintaining unrestricted competition and encouraging the
expression of performers' abilities through the medium of record-
ings.89 Record piracy was not a significant problem in 1909. The
focus of congressional consideration was the issue of composers' rights
in copyrighted music, in particular their right to control mechanical
reproductions of their work. In addition, at the time there existed
serious doubts about the constitutionality of federal copyright for
recordings." In light of its legislative history, it would be inaccurate
to regard the Act as an elaborate pre-emptive structure; that is, to
assume that Congress surveyed the entire field of "writings" and then
picked out all the meritorious categories which require protection,
deliberately leaving the rest to fend for themselves under conditions
of unrestrained competition.91
Though the Copyright Act's omission of record protection should
not, per se, operate to preclude state protection of recordings, such
protection of a recording of a copyrighted composition may be deem-
ed inconsistent with or limited by specific provisions or basic policies
of the Copyright Act.92 Under the Act, once the holder of a copyright
89. See Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A False Step in
the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doctrine, 71 COLUM. L. Rr:v.
1444, 1463-66 (1971).
90. See, e.g., Ringer, The Unauthorized Duplication of 'ound Recordings, in
I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 122. In 1909 there was doubt that a recording was a "writ-
ing" of an "author" as those terms are defined by article I, § 8 of the Constitution.
This doubt derived much of its force from the case of White-Smith Music Publish-
ing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). In that case the Supreme Court held that
under the pre-1909 law a music roll was not a "copy" of a copyrighted musical
composition and thus the manufacture and sale of rolls could not be enjoined as
an infringement. In construing the term "copy" the Court spoke in terms of a
form intelligible to the eye. As a result, some argued that copyright protection of
aural works would be unconstitutional. However, the Apollo case involved only
an interpretation of the existing statute, not the Constitution, and a construction
of the term "writing" which required intelligibility to the eye would clearly
represent an unacceptable rigid limitation on congressional power. It is now
clear that a recording constitutionally qualifies as a "writing"; a musical per-.
formance fixed on a tangible record undoubtedly may be made the subject of
copyright under the copyright clause. See note II supra.
91. See Price, The Moral Judge and the Copyright Statute: The Problem of
Stiffel and Compco, 14 ASCAP COPYRIGHT SYMPOSIUM 90. 113 (1966); See generally
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
92. Our concern here is solely with the right of reproduction and does not in-
dude state recognition of a right to control the performance of a record, which
raises different issues. The provisions of the Copyright Act should be held to
preclude state recognition of a performance right in a recording of a copyrighted
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on a musical composition records or licenses another to record his
song, anyone else may make a record of the composition by paying
him the prescribed fee of two cents per record manufactured. 3 It is
not clear how a state recognized right of reproduction would be in-
tegrated with the compulsory license provisions applicable to the
underlying composition. Would the holders of state copyrights on
recordings be obliged to license reproduction of their records under
the terms of section 1(e)? Probably not. The compulsory license provi-
sion for musical compositions was not designed to insure the free use
of recorded renditions93 a Since anyone may make his own recording
of a song upon payment of the stipulated license fee to the holder of
the music copyright, and since entrance into the record business is
quite easy, compulsory licensing is not required to assure wide dis-
semination of musical ideas.
Under section 7 of the Copyright Act, only arrangements of a cop)-
righted composition which have been produced with the consent of
the proprietor may be copyrighted. 94 Conceivably, the reproduction
of a performer's rendition may be deemed an arrangement in that like
an arrangement it derives from and interprets the original composi-
tion. If so, it may be argued that a state granted record copyright
work. Section l(e) gives the proprietor of the copyright on a musical composition
exclusive control over public performance for profit. State recognition of a per-
formance right would involve a significant dilution of the control over performance
which Congress vested in the proprietor of the composition. See Kalodner & Vance.
supra note 10, at 1122.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970): "Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with
the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right ... To perform the copy-
righted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; and for the pur-
pose of public performance for profit, and for the purposes set forth in subsection
(a) hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any
system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may
be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced: Provided, That ...
as a condition of extending the copyright control to such mechanical reproduc-
tions, that whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted or
knowingly acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instru-
ments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may
make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to the copyright
proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part manufactured . . . . The
payment of the royalty provided by this section shall free the articles or devices
for which such royalty has been paid from further contribution to the copyright
except in the case of public performance for profit."
93A. See pp. 232-35 infra.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1970): "'Compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrange-
ments, or other versions of ... copyrighted works when produced with the consent
of the proprietor of the copyright in such works . . . shall be regarded as new
works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title ....
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requires the consent of the copyright holder. But under the Copyright
Act, the copyright proprietor's consent does not have to be obtained
for an arrangement which is used solely for recording pursuant to
the compulsory license provision of section l(e). Clearly, requiring
such consent would frustrate the purpose of compulsory licensing.
Thus, one might argue that a state grant of a reproduction right
would not be inconsistent with the language or policy of sections 1(e)
and 7 if the protection were limited to prohibition of unauthorized
duplications of recordings whose producers have paid the statutory
license fee to the holder of the music copyright.9'  State protection
would not be available for other kinds of arrangements unless the
consent of the music copyright holder was obtained.
Based upon these arguments, some scholars have concluded that
sections l(e) and 7 of the Copyright Act permit states to grant per-
formers or record producers protection from unauthorized duplica-
tion of records made pursuant to the compulsory license provisions
of section l(e).9 6 But this reasoning seems to overlook the overriding
concern of the Copyright Act with the welfare of the composer, and
the fact that the Act only tempers the composer's absolute control
over the use of his music in order to insure maximum use of musical
ideas and prevention of their monopoli7ation by a few recording com-
panies. In the absence of such concerns, the Act unambiguously grants
final control of the music to the composer. State protection of record
producers would not expand the dissemination of musical ideas. If
anything, it might restrict it. But such protection would limit the
copyright holder's control over the use of his music in that record
producers, rather than the copyright holder, could prevent copying of
renditions of the copyright holder's music. The argument that copy-
right holders generally oppose record copying is irrelevant and ir-
rational. Under the legal structure we support, unauthorized repro-
duction of a record would constitute a copyright infringement. There-
fore a composer may prevent copying of the record of his copyrighted
composition simply by refusing to permit such copying. Granting the
record producer the right to control reproduction of recordings of
copyrighted music shifts final control over record copying from the
composer to the record makers.
95. See Kalodner & Vance, supra note 10, at 1123-24.
96. See id. Clearly, states could not deprive the copyright holder of his right
to approve arrangements not used for making records.
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This issue is sharply focused by the question of a record duplica-
tor's right to compulsory licensing under section l(e). Pirates have
operated on the assumption that prior to the McClellan amendment
they were committing no copyright infiingement so long as they
followed the formalities and made the royalty payments prescribed
by section 1(e) of the Copyright Act.97 Recently, however, publishers
have asserted that the duplicator is not making a "similar use" of the
music within the meaning of the statute and is therefore not entitled
to avail himself of the compulsory licensing privilege. A compulsory
licensee, the publishers claim, is restricted to making new recordings
of the copyrighted musical work; he is not permitted to invoke section
1(e) in order to duplicate recordings of the copyrighted music made
by another. Thus, even though a duplicator complies with the stat-
utory formalities and pays the statutory royalty, he infringes the copy-
right on the music used for the duplicated recording.
In 1972, two federal courts have split over the duplicator's right to
compulsory licensing. In Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the right of a music publisher
to reject the tender of the statutory license fee by a record copier.05
The decision heavily relied upon Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll
Co.99 and adopted that court's characterization of record copying as
misappropriation. 00 Subsequently, the New Jersey Federal District
Court refused to follow the Ninth Circuit and upheld the right of a
record copier to invoke the compulsory licensing provision. 01 Per-
97. Prior to 1972 there was very little authority either way on this issue. In
Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rer'd on other giounds, Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957). cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952
(1958), a case involving a duplicator who had neither paid the statutory royalt)
nor given the requisite notice, the court stated that the duplicator was entitled
to a compulsory license if he had met the statutory requirements. Id. 177. 180 nA.
The only other case, Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y.
1912), ruled against the copier's right to a statutory license.
98. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1972). retig 331 F.
Supp. 127 (D. Ariz. 1971), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 52 (1972).
99. 196.F.926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
100. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit, in relying exclusively on Aeolian and
its characterization of the defendant's behavior as "appropriation." fails to
squarely confront and analyze the difficult question of the correct interpretation
of section 1(e). In any case, simply labeling a duplicator's behavior as "appropri.
ation" is no answer to the complex issue of the extent of protection the law should
afford to recordings. See note 64 supra and pp. 237-38, 245-46 and notes 110, 140
infra.
101. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings. Inc., 176 U-S.P.Q.
110 (D.N.J. 1972).
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mitting the copyright holder to refuse to license a record copier,
argued the court, would have the effect of de facto extension to all
records the copyright privileges granted by the McClellan amendment
only to records produced after February 15, 1972.102
Adjudication of the controversy over the reproducer's claim that
he may avail himself of the compulsory licensing right provided by
section 1(e) involves a choice between the composer's right to max-
imum profit from his musical efforts and the public interest in max-
imum dissemination of musical ideas. If the latter consideration is
deemed uppermost, the record reproducer should be entitled to com-
pulsory licensing privileges, for this will expand the number of rec-
ords produced and lower the price. 10 2t In these circumstances, though,
state action permitting the record producer to restrict unauthorized
reproduction of his product permits the record producer to frustrate
this purpose by refusing to permit duplication. In other words, the
only valid reason to permit the record reproducer access to com-
pulsory licensing privileges is to maximize dissemination of musical
ideas. Granting the record producer the right to prevent reproduction
can frustrate this purpose and therefore must be deemed inconsistent
with the Copyright Act. 102"
If the right of the composer to profit from his efforts is deemed
most important, section 1(e) should be read to limit compulsory
licensing to record producers. But if the copyright holder is to profit
from this interpretation, he, and not the record producer, must have
the final authority to permit the reproduction of records licensed
under his copyright. State granted anti-copying protection would shift
this authority from the copyright holder to the record producer. Con-
102. The district court also argued that a construction in favor of the duplicator
would be consistent with the understanding of the Act of the Congress which
passed the McClellan bill. See H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1971).
Though the court regarded this correspondence as very persuasive, it should not
be viewed as very weighty. After all, Congress and the witnesses who testified
before it could be wrong, and they did not give the question of the correct inter.
pretation of section 1(e) any sustained thought. The views of the 92d Congress
on this issue should be treated no differently than those of a commentator; both
should be judged on the basis of how well reasoned they are.
102a. This effect may be short-lived. See pp. 247-48 infra.
102b. Conceivably a state record copyright which included compulsory licensing
of the recording would be consistent with a policy of maximum dissemination of
music. However, none of the existing state anti-piracy laws contain a licensing pro-
vision, and the record industry has been unalterably opposed to such licensing of
duplicators.
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sistency with the goals of the Copyright Act requires that tie copy-
right holder must be given the discretion to decide whether or not to
permit copying. Of course, the copyright holder could agree with a
record producer not to permit copying, but presumably he would
receive compensation therefor.
The resolution of the issues surrounding a record copier's access
to the compulsory licensing system established by section l(e) ulti-
mately depends upon whether one interprets section l(e) as directed
towards the widest possible use of musical ideas or the widest distribu-
tion of recorded performances. If the prevention of potential monop-
olies of musical ideas is the central concern, then limitation of com-
pulsory licensing to record producers would serve this purpose.
Extending the compulsory licensing privilege to record copiers is
unnecessary since the copier is only interested in existing recorded
performances, not musical ideas. Moreover, the record industry
affords easy entrance, thereby assuring sufficient numbers of en-
trepreneurs to translate musical ideas into forms available to the
listening public. If granting compulsory license rights to copiers
would not further the purposes of section l(e), the Act should be
interpreted to maximize the composer's rights. This means denying
copiers the right to compulsory licenses and granting the copyright
holder sole discretion in licensing record reproductions. It also means
that any state action which limits these rights would be inconsistent
with the Act.
In attempting to determine the extent to which the Copyright Act
limits state power to legislate in this area, it is essential to bear in
mind that the driving intent of the Copyright Act is to strike the
appropriate balance between encouragement of composers and max-
imum dissemination of musical ideas. Thus, it is the composer who
holds the copyright. When the need to prevent monopolization of
musical ideas calls for restriction of the composer's total control of
his product, as exemplified by the compulsory licensing requirements
of section 1(e), the composer's interests are protected by a compen-
satory license fee. The imperatives of this well articulated federal
legislative scheme clearly preclude inconsistent state action. Permit-
ting record producers to restrict reproduction of their product is in-
consistent with the legislative scheme in that it deprives the copyright
holder of the right to control the use of his composition, without any
compensating public benefits through broader dissemination of
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musical ideas. The assertion that composers oppose unauthorized
record reproduction is beside the mark. They may well oppose un-
restricted reproduction, but if given their choice they certainly would
prefer having the final say on record reproduction themselves rather
than granting this power to the record producer. The thrust of the
Copyright Act (prior to the McClellan amendment) gives composers
this right and no state action should be permitted to undermine it.
Preclusion of state authority to protect records against reproduc-
tions unauthorized by the record producers is consistent with the
treatment of recordings of copyrighted literary works. The compulsory
license provision (section 1(e)) does not apply here.10 3 Sales of un-
authorized reproductions of a recording authorized by the copyright
holder is an infringement of the author's copyright, and is subject to
the normal statutory remedies. 104 Clearly, state recognition of a repro-
duction right in a performer or recorder of a literary work would
dilute the copyright proprietor's sole control over the recording and
sale of recordings of his work.1 5 Though the argument is somewhat
more complex, exactly the same analysis should apply to state recog-
nition of a reproduction right with respect to a musical composition;
such state action undercuts the rights granted by the federal Copy-
right Act.'0 6
THE RELEVANCE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In addition to the constraints derived from the copyright clause
and the Copyright Act, the commerce clause may impose further
103. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c),(d) (1970).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
105. Kalodner & Vance, supra note 10, at 1125.
106. This conclusion points up another issue, Assuming a state cannot grant a
reproduction right in a recording of a copyrighted composition, can it grant such
a right in a recording of a work in the public domain? The answer should be
"yes." By definition the Copyright Act does not apply because works become part
of the public domain after the expiration of the copyright or in circumstances
where no copyright was obtained. Thus there can be no dilution of the copyright
proprietor's rights. The Act's purpose of providing incentive for composers has
already been satisfied, and recognition of a right here does not significantly impair
the dedication of the underlying work. The public will have access to the work
through sheet music, radio performances, and other recordings. When the copy-
right on the underlying music expires, then a reproduction right should be per.
mitted. See Kalodner & Vance, supra note 11, at 1124-26. But cf. G. Ricordi & Co.
v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952). The copyright clause still applies, but,
as we have argued, the clause does not preclude state jurisdiction over records if
the limited times provision is satisfied. See pp. 217-22 supra and pp. 249-52 infra.
The same may be said with respect to the competitive mandate of the commerce
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limits on state authority to control record copying.'07 Certainly, given
the interstate character of the business of both record companies and
duplicators, and the inevitable burden of differing state regulations
of the same transaction, there is no doubt that the most appropriate
source of protection for recordings is Congress. 10 Moreover, in light
of the nationwide character of contemporary communications, it is
best that a national perspective be applied when striking a balance
between protection of intellectual and artistic writings (incentive)
and dissemination of these writings (access).'09 In addition, the proper
degree and form of protection for recordings is more appropriately a
legislative, rather than a judicial question. An adequate response to
the duplication problem must evaluate the record industry's conten-
tion that further legal protection is necessary to provide adequate
incentives for artists and record companies, and to ensure the eco-
nomic survival of the record industry."10 Only extensive legislative
dause. See pp. 246-48 infra. Conceivably. other aspects of the commerce clause may
preclude implementation of state anti-copying laws which bar importation and
sale of duplicated records shipped from other states, even if the limited times
requirement were met. See pp. 236-46 infra.
107. Apparently the relevance of the commerce clause in this context has
heretofore been completely ignored by the cases and commentators.
108. The desirability of a federal approach is underscored if one envisions a
comprehensive scheme of protection which defines not only the record company's
right of reproduction but also the right of public performance. The protective
scheme therefore affects the broadcasting media which operate across state lines
and require a uniform law of artistic "property" so that they are not subjected
to possibly different state rules.
109. Holmes' admonition that the commerce clause is concerned with guaran-
teeing that certain decisions are made by those "trained to national views" seems
particularly relevant with respect to intellectual and artistic products with their
first amendment aura. 0. W. HOLMF.S. CoLLEcrED LECAL PAPrns 296 (1920). See
generally Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (a "field in which the
federal interest is . . . dominant").
110. The record duplication issue raises at least four sets of questions: 1) Is
protection against duplication necessary? That is, is it required in order to obtain
an adequate supply of records; would the normal functioning of the market, with-
out the intervention of a copyright or other supporting mechanism, provide suffi-
cient incentives to insure this supply? Do noneconomic interests necessitate a
general restriction on duplication? 2) What is the requisite level of protection or
support? 3) What is the most efficient and "fair" means of implementing this
protection? Is a federal copyright the way to do it? 4) What should be the detailed
terms of the protective scheme? The answer to the first question, in turn, requires
the resolution of a series of difficult factual issues. What, in fact, is the duplicator's
cost advantage? How large is the differential? Is it offset by advantages available
only to the first record producer? For example, what is the extent and significance
of the initial producer's headstart? Will this headstart permit him to recoup his
fixed costs and more before competitors enter into production? Are there means
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investigation can answer these questions and thereby accurately
weigh all the interests at stake in a definition of rights in recordings.
A court is limited in the materials it can consider by the forms it must
observe, and it often will not have access to relevant information
which is available to legislators. Neither measured quantities, such as
specification of a precise term of protection, nor requirements of form
are usually products of the judicial process.' A legislature is better
equipped 1) to make the inquiries which should precede a determina-
tion of the limitations which should be set on protection for record-
ings, and 2) to introduce any machinery necessary for effectuation of
the protective scheme." 2 The states, and particularly the state courts,
are unlikely to produce a rational scheme for the protection of
recordings.
But is this federal legislative preference of a constitutional order?
The issue here is the limits imposed by the commerce clause on state
authority to define "unfair business practices" and on the means of
enforcement a state may choose to implement its concepts of legit-
imate business practices." 3 More precisely, may a state prohibit the
sale in the original package of a product-in our case, a duplicated
record-which has been shipped from another state? A line of Supreme
for minimizing his risks? In short, what would happen if there were unrestricted
competition in the production and sale of individual recordings? If copying were
legitimate, would record production be as seriously threatened as record companies
assert?
I1l. As Ernst Freund has said, "Principle can determine that a female em-
ployee shall not be overworked, it cannot say, ten hours, not eleven." Freund,
Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 ILL. L. REV. 264, 269-70 (1918); E.
FRlEUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION 3, 9-10 (1932).
Similarly, a court is not able to elaborate a compulsory licensing system. A
court can provide a judicial analogue to the compulsory license by denying an
injunction and confining the complainant's remedy to money damages. However,
even if courts were prepared to consistently deny injunctions (and it was proper
for them to so act), the advance planning of record production and royalty pay-
ments, leading to increased dissemination of recordings, would be far better served
by legislative prescription of a compulsory licensing system than by judicial case.
by-case determination of damages after the fact. Also, the limitation of rights by
setting fixed ceilings on duration of protection or on remedies is generally foreign
to the all-or-nothing predisposition of courts.
112. See generally Int'l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-67
(Brandeis, J. dissenting); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.
1929) (L. Hand, J.); L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (unpub.
lished mimeo 1959).
113. Subsequently we will apply the commerce clause to determine if the
probable anti-competitive consequences of state record production warrant a ban
on such protection. See pp. 246-48 infra.
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Court cases seems to say "no."114 Leisy v. Hardin, which held a "dry"
state may not prohibit the importation or sale in the original package
of liquor sent from a sister state, and successor cases seem to hold that
a state may not exercise prohibitory authority against outside prod-
ucts unless the aim is to prevent disease or commercial deception.11 5
Duplicated records are obviously not inherently deleterious in any
health sense. And while the states can act to curb deception, the sale
of these records does not involve fraud, at least in the technical sense
of deceptive advertising or "palming off." The duplicator, unlike the
counterfeiter,116 does not try to pass off his product as the original;
he explicitly informs the consumer that his product is a copy. The
exercise of state authority here does not involve the traditional basic
police power concerns for public health, safety, or morals. Certainly
state concern with record duplication seems less central than state
interest in liquor." 7 State anti-piracy laws, then, may violate the com-
merce clause principle that except as indicated above, the states are
not to decide what products from other states or countries may cross
their boundaries or to admit for sale in the state only those products
which satisfy local economic policy; rather it is for Congress to decide
what articles shall pass in interstate commerce.11 8
114. Bowman v. Chicago & NAV. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (liquor); Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (liquor); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1
(1898) (margarine); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900) (cigarettes); Kirmeyer
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568 (1915); see 1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COM..tENTARY ON TIE CONsT-
TUTION OF THE UNrrnD STATES 268-74 (1963); Bul see Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S.
321 (1903) (lottery tickets).
115. This concept is based in part on the adequacy of the political representa-
tion of groups affected by state legislation. Where legislative action burdens those
outside the state, it may not "be subjected to those political restraints which are
normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within
the state." South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 US. 177,
185 n.2 (1938) (Stone J.). Those outside the state have no representatives who
participate in the legislation. This perception may be relevant in the record
duplication context. An anti-piracy bill which was introduced in the North Carolina
legislature, for example, failed to pass due in large part to the opposition of
duplicators who reside in that state and whose views were presented to the legis-
lature. A similar bill failed to be enacted in Georgia after duplicators had a chance
to voice opposition to the legislature. On the other hand, Congress determined
that record companies and performers required protection, even though duplica-
tors had a fair opportunity to oppose the McClellan amendment.
116. See note I supra.
117. See Bowman v. Chicago & N.V. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 510.23 (1888) (dissenting
opinion); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125-160 (1890) (dissenting opinion).
118. Clearly, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not
prevent a state from prohibiting the manufacture and sale of duplicated records
within its territory. But a law may be consistent with the due process clause of
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Though effective state action against record duplication un-
doubtedly impedes some interstate shipments, many of the usual
reasons for limiting state authority over interstate commerce do not
apply. Unlike many enterprises, record duplicators can function
effectively under a legal regime in which duplicated products may be
sold in some states but not others, and where anti-duplication legis-
lation varies from state to state. Duplicators require a minimum of
fixed capital and can operate profitably at very low volumes. More-
over, it is unlikely that many states-particularly state courts-would
permit duplication. In the last few years every state court presented
with a duplication case has ruled against the duplicator. Prohibition
of the sale of out-of-state duplications by most, but not all states,
might change the posture of the constitutional issue if the duplicators
could demonstrate that these restrictions prevented them from opera-
ting in those states which had not barred duplication. The effect here
would be that action by some states had limited the freedom of other
states to follow their concept of fair business dealing with respect to
an aspect of interstate commerce that had not been proscribed by
Congress." 9
Another reason for limiting state regulation of interstate commer-
cial activities is to preclude state efforts to discriminate against out-
of-state businesses. However, both record companies and duplicators
operate nationally, and existing state regulation evinces no prejudice
against out-of-state enterprises. Thus, while New York, Tennessee,
and California, the sites of the three principal recording centers in
the country, have enacted anti-piracy statutes, other states which are
not centers of record production have enacted similar laws.120
Interpreting the commerce clause to preclude states from prohibit-
the fourteenth amendment and still offend the commerce clause. See, e.g., Schollen-
berger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1898); Dowling, interstate Commerce and
State Power-Revised Version, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 280,
293 (AALS 1963). However, since the duplicator can avoid state anti-duplication
laws by reestablishing his operation in a state where duplication is legal, effective
state protection of records would require a prohibitory law in each of the fifty
states.
119. Where uniformity is a central issue, it is not clear whether existing con-
flicting laws must be shown or whether the risk of potential multiple inconsistent
burdens is sufficient to justify a commerce clause claim. See G. GUNTHER & N.
DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 647-48 (1970). Compare
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) with Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960).
120. See note 5 supra; Brief for State of Texas Amicus Curiae at 2-4, Goldstein
v. California, cert. granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
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ing the initial sale of duplicated records seems inconsistent with the
line of decisions granting injunctions against the unauthorized re-
broadcasting of sporting events121 and the commercial copying of
news reports.122 The INS decision, based upon pre-Erie federal com-
mon law, involved unauthorized and uncompensated commercial use
of news gathered by International News Service for sale to its sub-
scribers.2 Since INS involved the application of federal, rather than
state, common law tort principles, the applicability of the commerce
clause was not at issue. However, the Court condemned the copying
of news as "fraudulent." 24 Assuming the Court would justify state
regulation of news copying under the commerce clause by analogizing
news copying to fraudulent advertising, it may be argued that record
copying also falls into that category of interstate transactions that may
be regulated by the states. The values at stake in INS seem exactly the
same as those involved in record copying. Conceivably, INS may be
distinguished from record duplication by finding a greater impro-
priety in copying news than copying records. And one might be re-
luctant to bar state action where the behavior involved is so gross that
the lack of a public response is somehow unseemly. Denying power
in such a situation would also deny the people of the states the in-
tangible but nevertheless real satisfactions to be derived from respon-
sive home government.l'- It may be argued, though without much
conviction, that unauthorized record duplication is less offensive to
widely held standards of propriety.
The same, or very similar, values at stake in INS were also present
in Sears-Compco. There, without reference to INS, the Supreme Court
invalidated state anti-copying law. Indeed, Sears may have overruled
INS, at least to the extent that INS no longer can support the author-
ity of a state to protect from reproduction a work, such as a news-
paper, which is statutorily copyrightable. If Sears was based on the
121. E.g., National Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489. 30 N.Y.S.2d 419
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
122. E.g., Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1935), reu'd on
jurisdictional grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); International News Service v. Asso-
ciated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Rahl, The Right To "Appropriate" Trade Values,
23 Omo ST. L.J. 56 (1962).
123. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The
Court in INS spent little time on the relevance of the Copyright Act; rather, it
viewed the case as raising a question of unfair competition. Id. 234-35.
124. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241-42 (1918).
125. See generally Dowling, supra note 118, at 294.
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copyright-patent clause, no state may extend the equivalent of copy-
right protection to a "writing," whether that writing is copyrightable
under the Act or not. In that case, one need not worry about the limits
on state authority imposed by the commerce clause since the states
would be constitutionally unable to protect records. 120 We, however,
have argued that Sears need not be read to require such exclusion
and that states should retain some limited jurisdiction over "writ-
ings."'127 If Sears is viewed as based on the limited times policy and/
or the pre-emptive effect of patent and copyright legislation, then the
commerce clause issue remains relevant in the record duplication
context,128 and therefore INS still may have significance. That is,
despite the fact that under the existing Copyright Act the states can-
not protect writings covered by the Act (and the newspaper articles
at issue in INS clearly are copyrightable), the Court's characterization
of the news copying as "fraud" may form the basis for permitting
state protection of records or other duplicable products under the
commerce clause.
In effect, the issue is the extent to which the federal courts under
the commerce clause may second-guess a state determination of what
constitutes a "legitimate" article of commerce. 129 The disposition of
the courts to second-guess will be influenced by the prevailing climate
of opinion. While half a century ago the Court indicated a state could
bar lottery tickets, 3 0 it might reach a different conclusion today.
Similarly, while the Court then stated that cigarettes could not be
barred,'8 ' a similar prohibitory law might be upheld today in light
of today's medical knowledge. With respect to duplicated records,
Sears indicates a disposition to tolerate "copying." This is consistent
126. Even if Sears is read to preclude all state protection of writings, the com-
merce clause would still be relevant to the question of the extent of state authority
to protect non-writings, i.e., those communications, such as a live sports broadcast,
which have not been reduced to tangible form.
127. See pp. 214-22, 228 supra, and pp. 249-52 infra.
128. That is, the commerce clause issue remains a live one if the Copyright Act
does not preclude state protection of records, see pp. 228-36 supra, or if the limited
times requirement does not apply to the states, see pp. 222-28 supra, or if the re-
quirement does apply but the states enact laws with a time limit.
129. One should not make the mistake of arguing that the states should have
jurisdiction over record copying because copying is "bad". Since there are valid
economic, political, and social arguments supporting free use of recorded per-
formances, copying is only good or bad to the extent federal and state law make
it so.
130. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
131. See Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
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with the Court's increasing tendency to view the use restrictions af-
forded by copyright and patent protection as an exception to the
normal regime of full competition. In addition, an artistic product
like a record is cloaked with a first amendment aura, however faint.
The McClellan amendment represents a contrary attitude-a con-
gressional determination to limit unauthorized reproduction of re-
corded performances.
In addition to the normal desire to preserve federalism by limiting
restrictions upon state police powers to those situations exhibiting a
clear threat to necessary federal powers, increased flexibility and
responsiveness constitute the principal policy reasons favoring state
authority over record duplication. Flexibility is gained by permitting
states to improve federal protection of intellectual products where
changed conditions require interstitial adjustments to existing federal
legislation. And the general responsiveness of the nation's legal ap-
paratus to new problems is enhanced by giving the states capacity to
act in an area which receives only sporadic congressional attention.
State authority is further supported by the limited anti-competitive
effect of barring unauthorized record reproduction. 132 Yet increased
state authority here is not without dangers. One might be justifiably
wary of pumping life into the "misbegotten tort of misappropriation"
and conclude that no state power is preferable to possibly diverse and
excessive protection and that the loss of possible beneficent state pro-
tection is an acceptable price of a functioning federalism. 13
In this context it is difficult to evaluate the impact of the Mc-
Clellan amendment which grants copyright protection to records
fixed and published between February 15, 1972 and January 1, 1975.
Ordinarily, Congress can authorize state action which would other-
wise be invalid under the commerce clause. However, the McClellan
amendment cannot be construed as authorizing additional state juris-
diction with respect to record copying. Neither the amendment itself
nor its legislative history addresses the question of state jurisdiction in
this area. In fact, the legislative history explicitly indicates that Con-
gress intended to take no position on the question of whether the
states are barred by the copyright clause from acting against record
132. See pp. 248, 251 infra.
133. See generally Brown, Product Simulation: A Right or a WIrong, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 1216, 1222 (1964).
1972]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
piracy. 3 4 Had Congress deliberately decided to protect only those
records produced after February 15, 1972 and to leave those made
prior to that date to free competition, a strong argument could, of
course, be made that the states cannot protect the latter class of
records. However, Congress never even considered applying the
amendment to previously produced records, and thus it would be
equally inaccurate to characterize the enactment of the amendment
as a judgment that records produced prior to its effective date are to
be left to unrestricted competition. 3 5
134. See H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1971); S. Rep. No. 72, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). Since the relevant committee reports were addressing
themselves to the impact of the copyright clause on state jurisdiction over record
copying, a fortiori the amendment may not be interpreted to take a position con-
cerning the impact of the commerce clause. Conceivably, if Congress did intend
to expand state jurisdiction over record copying it could accomplish this equally
well under the copyright or the commerce clause.
135. Passage of the McClellan amendment seems irrelevant to the constitution-
ality of state law protection of recordings produced prior to February 15, 1972.
Section 3 of the amendment reads:
(N]othing in title 17, United States Code, as amended by section
1 of this Act, shall be applied retroactively or be construed as
affecting in any way any rights with respect to sound recordings
fixed before the effective date of this Act.
The record companies, citing Professor Nimmer, have argued that this section
implies that records produced prior to the McClellan amendment enjoy some
measure of state granted anti-copying protection. See Brief for Recording Industry
Association of America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 28, 33 n.86, Goldstein v. Cal-
ifornia, cert. granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972); 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 35.225 (1972).
Nimmer assumes that if not for section 3, Sears would bar state protection of
records. However, he reads the phrase, "nothing in title 17 . . . as amended by
section 1 of this Act," as applying to the entire Copyright Act, rather than just
to the McClellan amendment. From this he concludes that section 3 overrules the
pre-emptive effect of Sears on state protection of recordings. His argument is
unpersuasive. It is clear from the legislative history that Congress meant to express
no position on the issue of pre-emption of state law. Indeed, it never even con-
sidered this question. See H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 13 (1971);
S. Rep. No. 72, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1971). Moreover, to the extent that the pre-
clusion of existing law is based on the copyright clause rather than on the Copy-
right Act, Congress cannot give the states any such authority. That is, Congress
cannot do so unless one concludes that analogous to the treatment of the com-
merce clause, Congress under the copyright clause may allocate jurisdiction over
writings between the states and federal government as it sees fit, and that section
3 represents such an allocation to the states. Finally, even if we accept Professor
Nimmer's arguments, the limited times restriction still would apply to state pro-
tection, thereby invalidating most existing state record protection. See pp. 222-28
supra.
Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments, one cannot characterize
section 3 as an instance of a congressional grant of jurisdiction to the states. As
noted above, Congress never considered giving such jurisdiction to the states.
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Applying traditional tools of constitutional construction, the com-
patibility of the commerce clause with state authority to ban the
importation and original sale of duplicated records is a very dose
question. So close, in fact, that the issue transcends its legal basis;
that is, it cannot be solved by legal analysis. Professor Charles Black's
doubts about the capacity of legal analysis to solve difficult commerce
clause questions are particularly apt here:
No set of general concepts has proved apt for managing this
material, and it is next to certain that none will .... It is
regrettable that the Court... should have to spend its time
on questions so lacking in legal quality, so little amenable
to reasoned rule. ... The questions that present themselves
... are questions of economic policy pure and simple, ques-
tions as to which regulatory pattern is preferable in the cir-
cumstances. Courts must deal with policy questions within
law, but these questions have no legal savor at all. 30
I would hazard that the Supreme Court would not read the commerce
clause to bar state authority to provide limited protection to
records. 37 Such a decision is appropriate, given the infrequency of
congressional action in copyright matters.' 3 But I would insist that
in exercising that power, whether judicially or legislatively, the state
must make an informed finding that there is a real need for protection
in order to provide sufficient incentives to composers, artists, or record
producers.1 39 The state should not be permitted to impede interstate
Moreover, the wording of section 3 is typical statutory boilerplate. When the
claimed effect of a congressional enactment is to validate an exercise of state power
which otherwise would be constitutionally precluded. Congress should be required
to provide an unambiguous statement rather than relying on routine boilerplate
language to achieve such a fundamental redistribution of governmental authority.
For example, Congress made its intention very clear when it decided to permit the
states to regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor. See Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C.
§ 121 (1970); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); Webb-Kenyon Act. 27 U.S.C. § 122
(1970); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
136. C. BLACK, P.RSPEC"IVES IN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 35, 37 (1970).
137. But see text at note 55 supra.
138. The conclusion that the copyright clause does not bar all state protection
of writings not only preserves the commerce clause issue but somewhat strengthens
my disinclination to interpret the commerce clause as precluding state action. The
argument is that if the speclfic section of the Constitution treating cop)Tight
matters permits state protection, one should be reluctant to determine this issue
on the basis of a very close commerce clause argument.
139. For a description of the kind of analysis which should be required, see
Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 888. 937, 941
(1964).
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sales of duplicated records solely on the simplistic Lockean argument
that "whenever one mingles his effort with the raw stuff of the world,
any resulting product ought-simply ought-to be his."1 40
The Federal Competitive Mandate
Although the direct applicability of the commerce clause to state
protection of recorded performances is problematical, the Sherman
Act and its brethren may establish a commerce clause based federal
mandate for a competitive economy that, absent congressional direc-
tion to the contrary, should be applied by the courts to all state
economic regulation subject to the commerce clause.' 41 Sears itself
might be viewed as an expression of a policy requiring that any state
interference with commercial competition for the purpose of promot-
ing aesthetic or scientific expression must be measured against federal
anti-monopoly directives. In Sears the Court said that federal patent
policy not only granted a public monopoly to inventors but also
limited and controlled the anti-competitive impact of the patent sys-
tem. In recent decades the Court has increasingly characterized the
patent system as a particular and limited exception to the anti-
140. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1204 (1967).
Proponents of copyright protection and extension often support their position by
reference to John Locke's celebrated "labor theory" as articulated in his Second
Treatise. J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government ch. 5, §§ 27-30 (T.
Cook ed. 1947). Unfortunately Locke's theory neither explains why property ought
to be created on a labor basis nor does it describe our actual practice. See Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1970). In my comprehensive
article on the record duplication issue, I analyze the "ethical" arguments for
protection, i.e., those arguments which assert the "moral" obligation of society to
recognize an artist's natural property right in his creation and to give him his just
reward for services rendered. I conclude that the Lockean theory of property is
insufficiently discriminating to rationalize the creation and alteration of con-
temporary economic relationships and that none of the ethical arguments provides
a convincing justification for a general prohibition against record duplication.
141. Professor Areeda refers to the antitrust laws to locate the paramount
federal mandate for a competitive economy. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRusT ANALYSIS
57-58 (1967). This mandate also may have constitutional origins. Preferably it
should be viewed as having mixed origins in the Constitution's commerce, copy.
right-patent, and supremacy clauses intermingled with antitrust legislation and
decisions. See Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF.
L. REv. 873 (1971). Justice Black relied on the patent clause for his derivation of
a "constitutional plan of a competitive economy," Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964), but the language with which he
characterized it suggests a broader base.
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monopoly policies embodied in the federal antitrust laws.142 Professor
Areeda, an antitrust scholar, seems to have adopted this approach.
Thus, he has restated the Sears reasoning in three steps: 1) Illinois
unfair competition law clearly "affects" interstate commerce signifi-
cantly; 2) such interference might be constitutionally permissible in
the absence of a contrary federal policy; 3) the antitrust laws express
a contrary federal policy. 14 3 Assuming we are unwilling to condemn
every state law creating results which, if privately arranged, would
conflict with the antitrust laws, this attitude requires us to develop
an analytic framework to determine the consistency of particular state
economic regulations with the federal competitive mandate. For-
tunately, antitrust analysis is helpful in that those factors which must
be considered in ordinary antitrust cases should also be relevant to a
determination of the constitutionality of state laws aimed at curbing
unauthorized duplication. These include the probable effects and
dangers of the restriction, its severity, the social benefits claimed to
justify the restriction, and the availability of less restrictive alterna-
tives.1 4
What result does a discriminating appraisal of these factors yield?
The restriction on duplication has been justified by the claim that
continued record production requires the elimination of unauthorized
duplication. The restrictive effects of enjoining duplication are clear.
It preserves the monopoly of the record producer against the potential
competition of record duplicators, thereby raising some record prices.
It also imposes transaction costs which would not otherwise exist1 45
But despite the short-run lower prices and greater access that might
result from permitting duplication, it is argued that in the long run
142. P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUrS ANALYSIS 58 (1967).
143. Id. The issue in Sears may be analyLed as the propriety of state law achiev-
ing results which, if privately arranged, would contravene the Sherman Act.
144. The Sherman Act might be taken as an expression of federal policy on
how to apply the commerce clause and to assess state compliance with the com-
petitive mandate, in the absence of congressional action in the area.
145. Transaction costs are the costs incurred in obtaining permission to repro-
duce a work. These costs include contacting the owner of the right to reproduce,
bargaining with him, and arranging for compensation. These transaction costs
are likely to increase as the period of protection lengthens. As time goes by, people
who are interested in duplicating old recordings will find it progressively more
difficult to locate the owner of the reproduction right and obtain his permission.
Facilitation of the copying of old recordings, though, is particularly important,
for an old recording which someone wishes to duplicate is likely to be of unique
merit or to be needed for socially valuable activities such as research and education.
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such duplication would destroy the incentive to produce. It is the
long-range competitive interest, then, that justifies some restriction
of record copying. In fact, the monopoly effects of a ban on un-
authorized duplication are limited by the competitive conditions in
the record industry which circumscribe a producer's ability to control
the market by restricting supply.146 The potential dangers of anti-
copying legislation are further reduced by the fact that, so far, the
states only have prohibited record duplication; imitation of the per-
former's style has not been proscribed.
Though the problem is quite complex, a good case may be made
supporting this concern about the socially injurious effects of un-
restricted duplication. 147 The difficulty with existing state anti-
duplication laws is the lack of a time limit on protection. Protection
unlimited in time cannot be justified; a less restrictive alternative is
available. State law protection with no durational limit violates the
federal competitive mandate, thereby rendering it unconstitutional
under the commerce clause.148 State protection of recordings which is
limited in time, however, need not violate federal anti-monopoly
policies. The federal Copyright Act provides a model of a time-limited
protective system which strikes a rational balance between access and
incentive. The Act can serve as a frame of reference without dictating
all the details of state protection.149
146. In most cases the record industry is characterized by a high degree of
competitiveness between records and record companies. Access to the industry is
quite free, and the large number of artists effectively limits the producer's ability
to control the market by restricting supply. Certain artists (for example, the
Beatles) may be an exception, but even here the ability to raise prices is limited.
Thus, the possibilities of record companies exploiting their monopolies at the
public expense are limited.
147. - Record production is characterized by a large proportion of fixed versus
marginal costs. The fact that most of the costs of record production are incurred
before the first record is produced and the cheapness of increasing the supply of
records means that record duplicators can easily undersell the original producer.
It also means that original producers must sell many records before reaching the
break-even point. And, with respect to popular records, the producer must depend
upon large sales of a relatively few successful records to recoup his costs for the
larger number of unsuccessful ones. Thus, unlike most monopoly situations, the
record companies can make a case that their very survival depends upon their
full control over their product.
148. As previously noted, the federal competitive mandate may derive from the
combined effect of several constitutional provisions. See note 141 supra. Unlimited
protection also is inconsistent with the copyright clause. See pp. 222-28 supra.
149. See Goldstein, supra note 141, at 896, 903-04; Kaplan, Publication in Copy-
right Law: The Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 487-88
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IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT FACTORS
Ultimately the allocation of jurisdiction between federal and state
government over "writings" in general and recordings in particular
should be resolved neither by textual exegesis nor by historical in-
quiry. Rather it should be accomplished by a careful appraisal of the
relevant policy factors along the lines followed in our analysis of the
impact of free market policies upon record protectionGO The issue
is now before the Supreme Court in a suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of the California anti-piracy statute.1 51 After analyzing the
impact of the Constitution and existing federal legislation, the Court
should consider three additional factors: I) the likelihood of encoun-
tering "writings" which might require protection but are not covered
by the Copyright Act; 2) the probability that Congress will promptly
consider providing protection to such writings; 3) the probable nature
of state law responses, i.e., are the states capable of effectively con-
sidering the relevant issues and will they be sensitive to all the values
at stake?
There is a distinct possibility that new forms of writings not con-
templated by existing federal legislation will emerge. As we have seen,
prior to the McClellan amendment sound recordings, though consti-
tutionally copyrightable, were not granted protection under the 1909
Copyright Act. It is impossible to predict how often this kind of situa-
tion will reoccur. However, congressional attention is limited, com-
plete foresight is impossible, and technological change always can
render federal legislation obsolete. A medium of expression may not
exist at the time of a congressional enactment, or the legislation may
be passed before the medium reaches the stage of development where
the need for protection is appreciated. In such circumstances state
law may offer the only feasible source of needed protection. The
existing statutory categories of works eligible for copyright may be
elastic enough to cover some new forms of writings. The term, "book,"
for example, is sufficiently broad to encompass many new kinds of
writings. And the Copyright Office will now accept for registration
as "books" certain computer programs.152 Yet technology always out-
(1955). See also Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LrGAL EsSAYS
213 (1934).
150. See pp. 246-48 supra.
151. Goldstein v. California, cert. granted, 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
152. U.S. Copyright Office, Circular 61 (May 1969).
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strips congressional foresight. Of course, Congress might avoid the
problem by extending protection to all "writings," thereby expanding
coverage to the limits of the copyright clause. But it is not clear, a
priori that all "writings" require protection, and Congress appro-
priately might wish to determine the need for protection of new forms
of writing case-by-case. Such an attitude, in fact, is reflected in the
general revision bill, which does not exhaust Congress' constitutional
copyright power.153
One might be more willing to prohibit "interstitial copyright"
protection by the states-particularly if one thought the necessary in-
stances of that protection are likely to be infrequent-if one were more
confident that Congress would respond promptly when protection
seems required. Of course, some delay in legislative response to new
problems is inevitable. Though Congress finally did grant protection
to recordings when the piracy problem became serious, Congress has
been particularly slow to respond to the need to modify copyright
law. The 1909 Act, for example, continues as our basic copyright
statute, essentially unchanged since its enactment. The general re-
vision bill has been bogged down now for several sessions of Congress.
Copyright reform moves slowly, if at all. The fact that state relief is
not available in a situation does not assure congressional concern
since congressional treatment of the subject cannot be compelled.
Therefore, complete reliance on Congress to respond to technological,
economic, and social changes in the area of intellectual activity would
be unrealistic. 54 Judge Hand recognized that if all state protection of
"writings" is precluded, the result almost certainly will be that at
some time a "writing" requiring protection will be denied it. Hand
accepted the resulting "unfairness" as a cost of exclusive reliance on
153. See S. 644, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 102 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13-14 (1967); Copyright Law Revision, Report of the Register of Copy-
rights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(House Judiciary Comm. Print 1961).
154. It has occasionally been suggested that a delegated administrative power
be established which could adapt the copyright statute to changing conditions.
B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, 110-11 (1967); Wilmarth, Statutory
Remedies for Record Piracy, 12 ASCAP COPYRIGHT SYMPOSIUM 261, 281-82 (1963);
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 11, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 719, 737-38
(1945). While congressional responses to changed conditions are likely to be late
or inadequate, those exercising this administrative authority could make continual
adjustments. Despite the virtues of this suggestion, no such far-reaching power is
contained in the revision bill or is likely to be established in the foreseeable future.
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Congress. 55 This attitude is difficult to accept here unless there exists
substantial probability of recurrent, excessive protection by the states.
Certainly states may grant protection to writings where no protec-
tion is justified, or they may grant excessive protection. But these
dangers may be avoided by congressional and judicial controls, short
of prohibition of all state jurisdiction. It is likely that the states often
will be unwilling or unable to undertake the extensive analysis neces-
sary to evaluate possible protections. Protection of writings equivalent
to copyright imposes economic and social costs stemming from re-
stricted access to the products involved. Thus each case requires
sophisticated economic inquiry into the structure of the industry
involved.156 Yet it is hard to imagine a situation where copyright or
its equivalent will produce grave economic consequences, especially
if protection is limited in time. Since copyright protection is limited
to the "expression" of ideas and not the "ideas" themselves and re-
stricts competition only between copies of the same work, the pos-
sibility that such protection will produce very serious anti-competitive
effects is significantly reduced. 57 The states have, on occasion, proven
themselves capable of discretion.15 8 The possibilities of restraint can
be significantly enhanced if Congress and the federal courts make it
clear that prudence is required and also provide clear guidance with
155. See Price, The Moral Judge and the Copyright Statute: The Problem of
Stiffel and Compco, 14 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAw, SY.%rosuIm 90, 104-06 (1966).
156. See pp. 237-38 and note 110 supra.
157. As a general matter, the power to accumulate patents is likely to prove
more detrimental to actual and potential competition than tie power to accumu-
late copyrights, for the scope of protection afforded patents is significantly greater.
See generally P. AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS 376-87 (1967). While copyright pro-
tection only extends to an author's "expression." a patent protects the use of an
inventor's "idea." This protection limits the production of competing products
which might keep down the price of the patented product.
158. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Spies, 167 U.S.P.Q. 492, 506
(Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County 1970), the court limited its injunction to a period of
ten years from the date of the first sale of a recording. In considering the question
of a time restriction, it said:
[T]he time may be measured for a maximum by that which would
protect the Plaintiff ... [if he] had, in fact, obtained a copyright
for the product in question. The time limit for the injunction
should be that period for which the Plaintiff would have pro-
tection had the phonograph record been eligible for copyright
protection less a reasonable period at the far end during which
the popularity of the artists and the songs rendered may be
expected to be of "de minimus" character.
Id. 500.
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respect to the limitations of state action in this area. State courts must
be induced to view the tort of misappropriation as fulfilling a modest,
limited function to be applied with circumspection. 159 They must be
particularly sedulous in insisting upon clear proof that protection is
necessary to fulfill the legitimate expectations of inventors, authors,
and artists and to ensure the economic viability of those responsible
for making their products available to the public. They also must
avoid basing their decision on simplicisms such as "record copying is
bad because the copier steals the record maker's property."' 1 0 They
might well take the Copyright Act as a model.' 01 And, if the states
stray too far, Congress can always intervene, although, as we have
seen, congressional action is not always quickly forthcoming.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional status of state jurisdiction to control the dupli-
cation of records not eligible for federal copyright is extremely com-
plex, comprising a cluster of intricate constitutional and statutory
issues. We conclude that although state jurisdiction over record copy-
ing violates neither the copyright nor the commerce clause, such
jurisdiction is inconsistent with rights granted the composer by the
federal Copyright Act, and is thus barred under the supremacy clause.
Even if the Copyright Act were amended to permit some state author-
ity over record copying, virtually all existing state law in this area
still would be unconstitutional because it is unlimited in time. Ac-
cording to our analysis, the copyright clause requires that all federal
or state protection of published writings be limited in time. And
application of the limited times requirement to published works
necessarily and appropriately implies that the limited times require-
ment also applies to federal or state protection of unpublished works.
159. See generally Rahl, The Right To "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 Onto
ST. L.J. 56, 57 (1962).
160. See pp. 245-46 and notes 129, 140 supra; McDonald, Book Review, 47
CANADIAN BAR REVIEW 142, 145 (1969) ("Wringing hands or raising voices over
.expropriation of property' or 'piracy' or quoting the Eighth Commandment, will
not contribute to the settlement of issues beyond providing an inarticulate point
of view, without reasons, on policy questions concerning both the fact and form
of incentive to be provided to creators.")
161. For an example of such refinement by reference to the Act, see note 158
supra.
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The federal competitive mandate also requires that state protection
of recordings be limited in time.
Since we believe that some effective state jurisdiction over the pro-
tection of intellectual and artistic products is desirable, we are not
entirely satisfied with this situation. The strongest case for state juris-
diction is with respect to new forms of "writings" rather than existing
forms such as records and tapes.162 In this context, the need for
prompt governmental response to new problems supports concurrent
federal and state jurisdiction. The sole requirement for such jurisdic-
tion with respect to writings would be an appropriate time limitation.
The time limit could be imposed by the states alone, or Congress
could provide limits or guidelines for establishing such limits, for
example by imposing an upper time limit on state protection of writ-
ings. The last alternative seems preferable. Congressionally provided
guidelines would provide an appropriate national perspective; state
judges and legislatures and federal courts would not have to guess
what constitutionally permissible lengths of protection might be with
respect to each new category of writings.
The case for state jurisdiction to protect records is less clear. Since
the problems surrounding records are known, the need for state
authority to provide flexibility to handle new situations does not
apply. Legally, state jurisdiction is impeded by two factors: the lack
of a time limit on protection and the structure of the Copyright Act,
which seems either to grant the composer the right to control record
copying, the view of the author, or to deny the composer such control
in order to maximize dissemination of recorded performances. 103 The
means for overcoming the first impediment are outlined in the previ-
ous paragraph. Congress can remove the second simply by amending
or clarifying the Copyright Act to give the record producer the right
to control duplication. But in contrast to other writings, where the
Copyright Act does not give anyone the right to control copying, the
existing federal regulatory scheme may be interpreted as affording
such control to the composer. And composers can cooperate with
162. The reference here is to state protection of writings which are not stat-
utorily copyrightable and the protection of which is not otherwise inconsistent with
the existing copyright statute.
163. The Copyright Act precludes state recognition of a reproduction right in
a recording of a copyrighted musical composition. The Act does not preclude the
states from granting a reproduction right in a recording of a song in the public
domain. See pp. 228-36 and note 106 supra.
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record producers in this regard, if they so choose. If this analysis is
incorrect and composers do not have the right to control the reproduc-
tion of records of their copyrighted compositions, or if Congress
should determine that the record producer rather than the composer
should have control over record copying, Congress can make perma-
nent by the McClellan amendment the temporary right of reproduc-
tion or permit the states to do so. If record producers do require more
control over their product, however, federal regulation is preferable
to state regulation because of the usual weaknesses of piecemeal regu-
lation by entities not constrained by a national perspective and be-
cause of the close connection of copyright with first amendment
connected interests in maximum dissemination of ideas.
